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deployment of the system. Streamlining is required by directives governing the acquisition process for
the Department of Defense, yet procurement remains quite cumbersome in execution. This thesis
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process within current laws and directives. Using the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault
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of the AAAV is required. While there is no prohibition against tailoring the acquisition cycle to
specific programs, the Department of Defense tends to be very risk averse with respect to acquisition
of weapon systems. The AAAV represents a weapon system that is uniquely poised for acceleration
of the acquisition cycle through tailoring. Recognition by DOD that there is a legitimate need for
accelerating procurement of the AAAV, and that program risk will not increase because of
acceleration must occur prior to utilizing the recommendations of this study.
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ABSTRACT
Acquisition streamlining is enjoying increased attention since procurement of weapon systems has
become more complex and lengthy from identification of a Mission Need Statement (MNS) to deployment
of the system. Streamlining is required by directives governing the acquisition process for the Department
of Defense, yet procurement remains quite cumbersome in execution. This thesis goes beyond
streamlining the acquisition cycle and provides methods of accelerating the procurement process within
current laws and directives. Using the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program as
an example, the research discovered that strategies exist which can specifically be tailored to accelerate
procurement of the AAAV without adding prohibitive program risk. To implement these methods, tailoring
of the acquisition cycle to specifically fit the unique characteristics of the AAAV is required. While there
is no prohibition against tailoring the acquisition cycle to specific programs, the Department of Defense
tends to be very risk averse with respect to acquisition of weapon systems. The AAAV represents a
weapon system that is uniquely poised for acceleration of the acquisition cycle through tailoring.
Recognition by DOD that there is a legitimate need for accelerating procurement of the AAAV, and that
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As defined by the current roles and missions statement,
the United States Marine Corps is tasked with the capability
of conducting amphibious assaults against enemy-held
shorelines. The Marine Corps is also responsible for the
development of "those phases of amphibious operations which
pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by
landing forces." [Ref. l:pp. 117-119] Since World War II,
surface-borne amphibious assaults have been carried out using
tracked landing vehicles capable of transporting embarked
Marines from Navy ships to defended beaches. From the advent
of the first amphibian tractor or "amtrack," the vehicle's
design has steadily evolved to incorporate newer technologies,
to match the changing security conditions or to meet new
tactical requirements.
The current version of the Marine Corps' amphibious
assault vehicle is known as the AAV7A1 family of vehicles.
The "family" of variants is composed of personnel,
communications and retriever versions of the basic design.
[Ref. 2: p. 1] The AAV7A1 was introduced to the Marine Corps
in 1972 as the AAV7 . In 1983, a service life extension
program (SLEP) was initiated which, by 1986, converted AAV7s
into AAWAls. The AAV7A1 was intended to serve as the Marine
Corps' vehicle for conducting amphibious assaults until the
year 2004. [Ref. 18:p. 41]
However, significant deficiencies have been identified
with the AAV7A1 over the past few years, and coupled with the
age of the system, these deficiencies have warranted the
search for a follow-on system to conduct amphibious assaults.
[Ref. 3:pp. 1-6] In addition to the identified weaknesses of
the AAV7A1, the Navy and Marine Corps have also developed new
tactical requirements for Naval Expeditionary Forces which
further contribute to the obsolescence of the existing
amphibious assault vehicle. [Ref. 4:pp. 1-6] These new
tactical requirements developed by the Navy and Marine Corps
form a concept for future expected amphibious operations
identified as Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) . [Ref. 5: pp.
1-4] This concept will be defined in detail in Chapter II of
this study.
The Marine Corps has determined, from an original field of
thirteen candidates, that a new vehicle is the solution to
advancing current amphibious capabilities. This system is
known as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)
.
[Ref. 6: pp. 5-9] The strategy which will be used to acquire
the system will be development and procurement of a new AAAV.
[Ref. 22] The Marine Corps is now wrestling with ways to
streamline the acquisition process so that the vehicle can be
fielded sooner than the current projection of 2009.
Accelerating the acquisition process, the major focus of this
study, is critical to the Marine Corps due to the increasing
age of the AAV7A1 family of vehicles and because the existing
vehicle will not adequately perform the new tactical
requirements of advanced amphibious assault. [Ref. 6:p. 5]
Another issue being studied is the role prototyping plays in
the acquisition method to be used for procurement of the AAAV,
and how that would affect acceleration of the acquisition
process.
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The objectives of this study are to: (1) identify the
concept of advanced amphibious assault and its manifestation
by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, (2) identify
viable methods of, and risks associated with, accelerating the
acquisition process for procurement of the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle, and (3) recommend a viable, accelerated,
acquisition strategy for procuring an AAAV for the United
States Marine Corps.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following major research question was posed to support
this study: What are the viable methods and associated risks
of accelerating the procurement process for the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)
?
To aid in answering this question, the following
subsidiary questions were addressed:
1. What is the concept of AAA as it relates to the current
roles and missions of the United States Marine Corps
and how is it manifested by the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle?
2. What are the critical criteria against which the
methods of accelerating acquisition should be
evaluated?
3. What types of risks are associated with each
acceleration method that has been presented?
4
.
What is the recommended strategy for procurement of a
new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle for the United
States Marine Corps?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained from
(1) current procurement literature, (2) documentation obtained
from the AAA Program Office, and (3) interviews with
acquisition professionals involved in acquisition streamlining
activities from Government and industry. Literature
references were collected from material held at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE) , and Department of Defense (DOD) Directives
and Instruction with applications to this effort. Interviews
were conducted by telephone and in person and are identified
in the list of references.
E. SCOPE OF STUDY
This study is in the form of a case study. Its scope is
to ascertain the viability of accelerating the acquisition
efforts for procurement of the AAAV. This study addresses
methods of acceleration and evaluates their potential
effectiveness with regard to the AAAV program. The evaluation
of acceleration strategies has been accomplished by review of
their effect on other programs to determine if the lessons
learned from them can be applied to the AAAV program.
F. LIMITATIONS
This study will address only those methods of accelerating
the acquisition process that are considered viable for use
with the Marine Corps AAAV procurement. Those methods will
then be analyzed for the associated risks they may hold for
the future of the AAAV procurement.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that readers of this study will have an
understanding of the basic concepts and regulations applicable
to systems acquisition.
H. ABBREVIATIONS
A list of acronyms used in this study, and their meanings,
is provided in Appendix A.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
Chapter II of this study examines the conceptual
development of amphibious assault and how the Marine Corps
procured equipment to support those operations. Chapter III
details what the concept of advanced amphibious assault is and
how it is manifested by the AAAV. Additionally, how the AAAV
and advanced amphibious assault fit into the "military
technical revolution" 1 will be addressed. Chapter IV will
present a brief overview of the Defense Acquisition Cycle and
provide distinction between some traditional methods of
quickening the acquisition process. Also, Chapter IV will
present selected methods of accelerating acquisition and how
they could shorten the overall procurement cycle for the AAAV.
Chapter V will establish the critical evaluation criteria for
each acceleration method presented in Chapter IV and then
evaluate their effectiveness in relation to procurement of the
AAAV. Chapter VI will conclude this study and will recommend
a strategy for procurement of the AAAV.
1 Mazarr, M. J. , Shaffer, J. , and Ederington, B. , The
Military Technical Revolution , Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, D. C. , March 1993.
II. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will cover the background of amphibious
assault doctrine and the development of equipment necessary to
prosecute that capability. Before the Marine Corps chose to
pursue amphibious operations, the Army and Marine Corps were
very similar in mission. After this decision, the Marine
Corps alone developed the doctrine, and later the equipment to
carry out this mission. This chapter details the Marine
Corps' involvement with amphibious assault, and the subsequent
development of vehicles to execute this mission.
B. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
The primary mission of the Marine Corps is to acquire and
maintain a capability to conduct amphibious assault
operations. This has been a formal requirement since the
National Security Act of 1947. However, the Marine Corps had
been focused on offensive amphibious operations long before
the Congressional mandate.
1. Background
An amphibious assault is an assault against opposition
having organized the beaches and those approaches to the
shoreline for defense. The concept of amphibious assault in
warfare is relatively new to the world. Lieutenant General
Victor H. Krulak, in First To Fight , contends that the first
serious thought given to this type of warfare was addressed in
the 1838 book, Precis de l'Art de la Guerre by Antoine H.
Jomini. However, the concept of amphibious assault against
organized resistance was largely ignored until the British
assault of Gallipoli in 1915. After the disaster at Gallipoli
the amphibious assault seemed doomed to consideration as an
infeasible tactic. In fact, B. H. Liddell Hart wrote that
because so many advantages resided with the defender, an
amphibious assault was, "difficult, indeed almost impossible."
[Ref. 7:pp. 71-72]
Just prior to World War I the Department of the Navy
had developed a contingency plan (War Plan ORANGE) for war in
the Pacific Ocean with Japan. By 1920, after some revision a
key element of the contingency plan was recognition that the
Japanese would use island territories and an increasingly
powerful Navy to challenge the United States in the Pacific
Region. The Navy planners realized under such a contingency
as "ORANGE," seizure of the Japanese islands and territories
would be required in order to defeat Japan. [Ref. 8: pp. 5-7]
Based on this scenario, the Chief of Naval Operations
informed the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the primary
emphasis of Navy planning would be for war with Japan. The
Marine Corps was advised to develop a structure to prosecute
that war, especially focusing on the seizure of advanced naval
bases. However, it was not until Major General John A.
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Lejeune became Commandant a few months later that the senior
leadership of the Marine Corps was ready to embrace the
concept of amphibious operations. [Ref. 8: pp. 6-8]
General Lejeune had a unique understanding of the
needs of the Navy should war with Japan occur. He saw the
vital importance of advanced bases for logistical purposes in
preparation for facing the ever-reaching Japanese empire.
Lejeune realized that should war with Japan take place,
American forces would be required to seize and hold their
logistics bases. This effort would require the attacker to
defeat an entrenched enemy through means of amphibious
assault. [Ref. 7:p. 74]
With a requirement identified and growing interest
within the Marine Corps the foundation was laid to begin
development of an amphibious assault doctrine.
2. Development of a New Type of Warfare
In order to arrive at a capability of seizing advanced
naval bases, as called for in "War Plan ORANGE," the Marine
Corps had to go through many phases of development. The first
of these phases would be to conceive a strategy of how the
Marine Corps' role would fit into a Pacific Ocean war with
Japan.
Defining the Marine role in "War Plan ORANGE" would be
the primary mission for Major Earl H. Ellis upon his
assignment to the Division of Operations and Training section
at Marine Corps Headquarters. Ever since his attendance at
the Naval War College in 1912 Ellis had long believed that
Japan would eventually initiate war with the United States,
necessitating a long and difficult series of Pacific island
battles to win back advanced logistics bases. The result from
Major Ellis was a study titled Advanced Base Operations in
Micronesia . [Ref. 8: p. 9] His study, completed in 1921,
outlined a step-by-step westward drive across the Pacific,
based on projected needs to support Fleet operations. This
effort became the framework for American strategy for war with
Japan in the 1924 revision of War Plan ORANGE and the Pacific
campaign in World War II. [Ref. 8:pp. 7-10]
Once an amphibious strategy had been developed to
support Naval operations against Japan, the Marine Corps
needed to plan for actual conduct of operations. Many of the
problems were foreseen by Ellis in his study. He identified
tactical and technical issues to be resolved, as well as the
potential man-made barriers and natural coral reefs which
would further complicate this new type of operation for
Marines. Additionally, he addressed the need for tight
coordination in naval gunfire and air support; the need to
organize landing beaches for logistics, and a host of other
details which would have to be addressed prior to actually
conducting amphibious assaults. [Ref. 7:pp. 76-79] Before
any of these problems could be solved, Ellis met an untimely
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death on May 12, 1923 while on a secret reconnaissance mission
to the Caroline Islands. [Ref. 8:p. 10]
This "theoretical framework" proposed by Major Ellis
then began development and limited testing under other Marine
officers during the early 1920s. Two Marines particularly
influential to the development of Ellis's theories were
Colonels Dion Williams and Eli Cole. Williams began a program
of educating the Marines under his command in amphibious
warfare. In addition, he conducted exercises in which his
troops practiced amphibious landings on the Potomac River.
Colonel Cole began an intensive study of the Gallipoli
campaign and the reasons for its failure. He also lectured
officers on amphibious operations, resulting primarily from
his research of Gallipoli. [Ref. 7:p. 79]
Both officers participated prominently in the Fleet
Exercises held in the early 1920s. Colonel Williams commanded
1600 Marines in the defense at Culebra in the West Indies in
1924. Approximately 1800 Marines under the command of Colonel
Cole made amphibious landings against the defensive force on
Culebra. [Ref. 7:pp. 77-80] This exercise was considered to
be an extremely large undertaking for a country during
peacetime.
Perhaps due to the scope of this effort, the novelty
of the tactics, or both, there were numerous problems with the
trial amphibious operations. Many of the problems were rooted
in coordination of efforts between the Navy and Marine Corps.
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Some boats were landed in the wrong locations, others at the
wrong time or out of order. Naval personnel were poorly
trained for such an operation or not knowledgeable of
requirements for amphibious operations. Naval gunfire and air
support were either inadequate or misdirected. There were
also problems with the boats used to land the Marines during
the operation. [Ref. 7:p. 80] The landing craft were not
only in short supply but provided virtually no protection to
the landing force for the trip from ship to shore.
Additionally, members of the landing force were further
endangered by having to leap over the sides of the boats at
the edge of the beach.
The most beneficial outcome of these exercises was the
realization by the Marine Corps leadership that amphibious
operations would require considerably more development both in
tactics and equipment to be successful. Any progress in
finetuning amphibious operations virtually ceased in 1926 due
to the heavy commitments on the Marine Corps in Haiti, China
and Nicaragua. [Ref. 8:p. 11]
In 1933, serious development of amphibious operations
by the Marine Corps resumed. The revival of interest in
amphibious assault at this point was more rooted in concern
with survival of the Marine Corps as an institution than any
other reason. The current Army Chief of Staff, General
Douglas MacArthur, had recommended to the President and
members of Congress that the preponderance of the Marine
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Corps, both personnel and equipment, be transferred to the
Army. MacArthur ' s reasoning was that most of the functions
performed by the Marines were identical to the Army, so the
Marine Corps was a drain on Army funding. The current
Commandant of the Marine Corps was concerned enough with the
power of General MacArthur that he assigned General Russell,
the Assistant Commandant, the task of developing an amphibious
mission for Marines. [Ref. 7:p. 80]
General Russell had been a proponent of amphibious
operations for the Marine Corps since 1910, when he stated
that when the fleet was operating from permanent bases it
should bring with it, "sufficient force and material for
seizing and defending" advanced bases in the theater of
operations. [Ref. 7:p. 75] He was able to convince the Navy
General Board to officially state that the primary function of
the Marine Corps should be "the seizure and defense of
advanced bases." [Ref. 8:p. 12] Next, Russell convinced the
Commandant that a formalized amphibious doctrine needed to be
written, not only to specify how amphibious operations would
be executed, but to demonstrate this was a unique and
desirable capability offered by no other military
organization.
The amphibious doctrine which would guide the Marine
Corps through World War II, and to a large extent to this day,
began at Quantico officer's school during the 1933-34 academic
year. Detailing this doctrine was considered so important
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that, instead of convening normal classes, officer students
and instructors combined their efforts to produce an
amphibious doctrine addressing tactics, equipment and many
other issues only conceptualized by Major Ellis. In June of
1934 a very detailed (127,000 words) "Tentative Manual for
Landing Operations" was completed. With some minor changes,
this manual was officially published by the Navy in 1938 as
"Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy." [Ref. 8:pp. 11-13]
Beginning in 1935 the Marine Corps began testing the
amphibious doctrine prescribed in the just-completed landing
operations manual. These exercises took place every year
through 1941. Not only were tests of the new doctrine
conducted, but crucial amphibious training was provided to
both Navy and Marine Corps personnel. These Fleet Landing
Exercises, combining elements of the Fleet Marine Force with
a Naval Task Force, served to hone the skills and cooperation
between the Navy and Marine Corps in conducting amphibious
assault operations. The exercises refined the previously
identified problems of Naval gunfire, air support and combat
loading. They also highlighted the major deficiencies of the
Marine Corps in terms of amphibious assault, including too few
and inadequate landing craft. [Ref. 8:p. 11-13]
C. EQUIPPING MARINES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS
Now that the Marine Corps had developed a new and unique
mission for their role in America's capability to conduct
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warfare, equipment needed to be procured to support that
effort. The equipment necessary for amphibious assaults was
a type of vehicle or boat that could transport Marines and
their equipment from Navy ships off of the shore, through the
surf zone, and disembark them at the area of assault. During
World War II, the proving ground for Marine amphibious
assaults, two pieces of equipment were used to conduct these
operations. They were the Landing Craft, Vehicle and
Personnel (LCVP) also known as the Higgins Boat, and the
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) Amphibian Tractor or Amtrac.
1. The Higgins Boat
The origins of the LCVP are rooted in prohibition.
Andrew Higgins designed a shallow draft thirty-six foot boat
in 1924 for use by rum-runners in the Mississippi Delta during
the years of prohibition. This boat, called the "Eureka," was
well-suited for beach landings because of its uniquely
designed underwater hull. This design protected the propeller
from hitting bottom in shallow water and also enhanced the
craft's ability to retract itself from the beach after
delivering its cargo. [Ref. 7:p. 92]
The Marine Corps first became aware of the Eureka in
1934, although Higgins had been attempting to interest the
Navy in purchasing the craft since 1926. The Marines were
very impressed with the capabilities of the Eureka and finally
convinced the Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair to buy
15
one of the boats in 1937. In 1939 the Higgins Boat was tested
along with three boats designed and constructed by the Navy's
Bureau of Ships. The 1939 test reached no conclusions, but
allowed the Eureka to remain in the qualified pool of
competitors. [Ref. 7: p. 94]
By March of 1941 the threat of war was becoming more
and more obvious. With this in mind, the Marine Corps asked
Andrew Higgins to redesign his Eureka boat to include a bow
ramp for landing small vehicles. Higgins was also asked to
design a similar craft that would be capable of transporting
an eighteen-ton tank. Higgins quickly transformed both
requests to working, full-scale prototypes and by April of
1941 five of these craft were undergoing testing and
evaluation by the Navy and Marine Corps. After the
evaluation, the Navy approved and ordered two hundred of the
Higgins Boats for use in amphibious operations.
[Ref. 7: p. 95]
2. The Amphibian Tractor
Although the Higgins Boat provided the Marine Corps
with a capability previously unavailable for use in conducting
amphibious operations, it could not solve all of the problems
that would face Marines in their drive across the Pacific.
The first problem unable to be resolved by the Higgins Boat
were the coral reefs which surrounded most of the islands to
be assaulted in the Pacific Ocean. The Higgins Boat was
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unacceptable when a coral reef was present because the water
was usually too shallow over the coral for a boat to negotiate
without ripping out its bottom. The second deficiency
constraining sole use of the Higgins Boat for amphibious
operations was the need to move supplies rapidly through the
beach area to avoid congestion of eguipment and supplies
there. Congestion at the landing area was one of several
problems observed by the Marines who had studied the
amphibious assault of Gallipoli during World War I.
[Ref. 7:p. 100]
The solution to these two problems for amphibious
operations came to be known as the Landing Vehicle Tracked-1
(LVT-1) , or amphibian tractor. Although conceptualized by the
inventor as early as 1933, the Marine Corps did not become
aware of its existence until the October 4, 1937 issue of Life
magazine which highlighted this new machine. [Ref. 8: p. 32]
The genesis of the amphibian tractor was born out of
disaster. In 1928 a tremendous hurricane devastated many of
the towns surrounding Lake Okeechobee, Florida. John
Roebling, a wealthy industrialist and financier with a winter
retreat in Florida, became very interested in the disaster and
the toll it had taken on the area. Many of the workers from
his Florida estate who had assisted in rescue operations for
the hurricane victims stated if a vehicle or boat had existed
which was as egually capable on land, mud and deep water, many
lives could have been saved during the rescue. [Ref. 8:p. 24]
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In 1932 John Roebling made a pact with his son Donald,
who by now owned the Roebling Construction Company in
Clearwater, Florida, to design a vehicle that "would bridge
the gap between where a boat grounded and a car flooded out."
[Ref. 9:p. 54]
The elder Roebling agreed to pay for all design,
development and production costs associated with the project.
John Roebling was motivated to invest in the amphibious
vehicle project for several reasons. The tragic events of the
1928 hurricane certainly influenced Roebling as a
humanitarian, but he could also foresee potential lucrative
markets for a land- and water-capable rescue vehicle. Lastly,
John Roebling wanted to interest his mechanically talented son
in some productive venture. [Ref. 8: pp. 24-25]
In January of 1933, Donald Roebling hired a technical
staff and began work on the amphibious vehicle project.
Roebling and his staff identified the two major obstacles to
making the vehicle a reality: weight, and propulsion systems
for land and water use. The vehicle had to be light enough
for safe buoyancy in water, while sturdy enough for rugged
terrain employment. The propulsion systems had to be simple
enough so they did not require so much area within the vehicle
as to make it useless. [Ref. 8:p. 25]
Roebling answered both issues with innovative ideas.
To meet both requirements for weight, he decided to use a
relatively new metal called aluminum since it was lighter than
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steel but would supply adequate strength for land use.
Propulsion of the vehicle on land and in water would be
accomplished by one system. Roebling took a track system from
a commercial crawler type tractor and attached cleats that
would perform much like paddles when the vehicle was operating
in the water. [Ref. 8: p. 25]
After experiencing numerous problems working with
aluminum and attempting to perfect the track, Roebling
produced his first amphibious prototype in 1935. The vehicle,
which was dubbed, "alligator," was capable of 25 miles per
hour on land and 2.3 miles per hour in the water. The first
alligator was not very reliable in that after just a few miles
of travel on land the tracks would break apart. Roebling was
undeterred and tried without success to interest the Red Cross
and the Coast Guard in his invention. [Ref. 8:pp. 26-27]
Accepting that his first model amphibian could be
improved, Roebling and his team dismantled their first version
and began design and construction of the Model II Alligator.
They completed the second model in April of 1936. This
vehicle was lighter and more easily maneuverable in the water.
The water speed of this model was also increased to 5.45 miles
per hour. Immediately after testing the Model II, it was torn
down and work began on the Model III amphibious vehicle. Five
months later, the Model III Alligator was complete and ready
to begin testing. This vehicle was slightly faster on land
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and water than its predecessor, but the track system was still
breaking after only a few miles use. [Ref. 8:p. 29]
In 1937, Donald Roebling finally had an amphibian that
met most of his earlier expectations for a rescue vehicle.
The Model IV Alligator was a shortened version of the Model
III with an improved suspension system. These modifications
significantly enhanced the performance and durability of the
vehicle. This latest Alligator, which was lighter, faster in
the water, more reliable on land and more maneuverable, had a
water speed of 8 . 6 miles per hour and a land speed of 18 miles
per hour. The costs for development over the four years for
Roebling amounted to $100,000.
[Ref. 8:pp. 31-32]
Since the Model IV Alligator closely resembled
Roebling* s desire for a rescue vehicle, he did not disassemble
this model. As a result of repeated testing of the Alligator
in the Clearwater area, the media became interested in
Roebling' s invention. In the October 4, 1937 issue of Life
magazine, Roebling' s amphibious vehicle was featured in the
Science and Industry section. The amphibian was presented as
a very versatile vehicle that was equally impressive in water
or on rugged terrain. The positive publicity received by the
Alligator was very likely the catalyst Roebling had been
looking for to produce customers for his "rescue" vehicle.
[Ref. 8. pp. 29-33]
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The Marine Corps became aware of Roebling's amphibian
through the story published in Life . In January of 1938, the
Marine Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb sent the Life
magazine to Major General Bradman, President of the Marine
Corps Equipment Board and directed him to evaluate Roebling's
Alligator for use in amphibious assaults. Initially the board
concluded that the Alligator was not suitable for the needs of
the Marine Corps. The lack of armor protection and new
suspension system contributed heavily to their lack of
enthusiasm. However, before dropping the Alligator for
consideration, Major General Bradman directed that additional
evaluation of the vehicle be conducted. [Ref. 8:p. 36]
During February of 1938 the Marine Corps Equipment
Board began a correspondence with Donald Roebling to obtain
additional information regarding his amphibian vehicle.
Roebling's positive responses to the board's questions
prompted the Marine Corps to send an officer to Florida to
inspect and evaluate the Alligator. The evaluation convinced
the Marine Corps that the Alligator was quite possibly the
vehicle to smoothly transition combat power from the sea to
land. Based on the glowing report of the evaluation, the
Commandant formally requested funds from the Navy to buy an
Alligator and test it under military conditions.
Unfortunately the Navy's limited funds for 1938 were spent on
development of Navy landing craft. [Ref. 8. pp. 37-38]
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In October of 1939 the Marine Corps sent a three man
committee headed by Brigadier General Emile Moses to
Clearwater, Florida to inspect the Alligator and assure
Roebling of the continuing interest held by the Marine Corps.
After this visit, a second request for funding from the Navy
was submitted. This request was successful and by April of
1940 Roebling was under contract to supply the Marine Corps
their first amphibian vehicle by November of 1940.
[Ref. 8:p. 39]
The vehicle delivered to the Marine Corps was
essentially a Model IV Alligator with several military
modifications suggested by various Marine evaluators or
inspectors during the course of their association with Donald
Roebling. The major changes that made this vehicle differ
from the Model IV were an engine change and a reduction in
overall weight of one thousand pounds. This vehicle was
capable of a land speed of 29 miles per hour and a water speed
of 9.72 miles per hour. [Ref. 8:pp. 40-42]
After delivery of the prototype vehicle, the Marine
Corps conducted a series of tests in different parts of the
United States and Caribbean to determine if the Alligator
would meet the requirements for amphibious operations. All
testing was highly successful and in February of 1941 the
Department of the Navy contracted with Roebling for 200
Alligators. The only changes from the prototype would be a
higher horsepower, slower speed engine to enhance land
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operations, and steel plating vice aluminum to provide some
protection from small arms fire and more durability against
coral and surf conditions. [Ref. 8:p. 43]
The first production amphibious vehicle was delivered
to the Marine Corps in August of 1941. It was designated as
the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Model 1 (LVT-1) Amphibian
Tractor and had a cargo capacity of 4 000 pounds. The LVT-1
was capable of 18 miles per hour on land and 7 miles per hour
in the water. [Ref. 8:p. 46]
Starting with the amphibious assault on Guadalcanal in
August of 1942, the amphibian tractor was used in every
amphibious operation of World War II by Marine Corps and Army
units. During the course of the war, the LVT progressed
through four cargo versions and two assault gun versions.
After World War II, the Army lost interest in
amphibious assaults and the amphibian tractor, leaving the
Marine Corps as the sole organization holding this weapon
system within the American military. The National Security
Act of 1947 recognized the primary mission of the Marine Corps
as "seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the
conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign." [Ref. 10:p. 118] This Act
also charged the Marine Corps with responsibility for
development of "amphibious operations which pertain to the
tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces."
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[Ref . 10:pp. 117-119] With this legislation, the Marine Corps
now had a separate and unique mission apart from the Army.
One of the possible reasons why the Army gave up on
amphibious operations so readily was the thinking of the
senior Army leadership at the time. An example of this
attitude was General of the Army Omar Bradley's indication,
during testimony before a congressional committee in 1951,
that amphibious campaigns were obsolete. Bradley stated, "I
am wondering whether we shall ever have another large-scale
amphibious operation." [Ref. ll:p. 66]
The thinking behind this statement may have been
rooted in the policy of containment which the United States
was practicing at the time. Perhaps Bradley and others were
remembering the high casualties in World War II amphibious
assaults such as Tarawa and Iwo Jima. Also, he may have
assumed the only possible war the United States would
participate in would be one fought on the plains of Europe
between America and our cold war enemy, the Soviet Union.
Whatever the reason, Bradley's statement did prove to
be premature, for a year later General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur requested the 1st Marine Division to conduct a
flanking amphibious assault against the North Koreans. The
risky assault at Inchon was very successful and the North
Koreans were driven back to their own territory.
[Ref. 12:p. 47]
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Many Marines and strategists believe that the landing
at Inchon was the final validation of the concept of
amphibious assault and the institution of the Marine Corps.
Despite Inchon's success, an amphibious assault of this
magnitude has not been launched by the Marine Corps since.
However, development of improved weapon systems to enhance the
amphibious capability of Marines has continued. Since Inchon,
the Marine Corps has fielded three successive versions of the
"Landing Vehicle, Tracked": the LVT-5 in 1953, which saw
action in 62 small amphibious landings and as armored
personnel carriers in Vietnam; the AAV7 in 1972, used for the
invasion of Grenada; and the AAV7A1, which saw extended use
during the Gulf War as an armored personnel carrier. The
AAV7A1 is essentially an AAV7 which was upgraded from 1983 -
1986 as part of a Service Life Extension Program.
[Ref. 13:pp. 74-76]
D. SUMMARY
Beginning with Gallipoli in 1915, Marine Corps interest in
the feasibility of amphibious assaults waxed and waned. With
the ascendance of Major General John A. Lejeune as Commandant
of the Marine Corps, pursuit of a workable amphibious doctrine
moved forward. While the doctrine of amphibious operations
was being completed, a concerted effort was made to equip
Marines with material to successfully compete an amphibious
assault. Vehicles were developed to carry out the mission,
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notably the LVT Amphibian Tractor and the LCVP. This chapter
discussed the development of the doctrine of amphibious
assault and the equipment used for this purpose.
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III. ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will focus on the rationale for amphibious
assaults, both now and into the twenty-first century. In
addition, the direction the Navy and Marine Corps defense
roles have taken since the demise of the Soviet Union and how
this direction impacts the concept of advanced amphibious
assault will be discussed. This direction, taken collectively
from the draft version of Operational Maneuver From The Sea ,
and the Navy and Marine Corps white paper titled . . . From The
Sea . defines the concept of Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA)
.
This chapter concludes by examining how advanced doctrine and
technology, as suggested in The Military Technical Revolution
,
are related to AAA and manifested by the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle (AAAV)
.
B. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS BEYOND THE COLD WAR
In order to adeguately address the advancement of
amphibious assault doctrine beyond the cold war and into the
21st century, the question of whether the United States needs
to maintain the capability to prosecute amphibious assaults
should first be addressed.
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1. Background
The demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
Alliance has caused the political leadership of the United
States to re-evaluate the "mix" of forces required for
America's defense needs. For more than 4 years the American
military was primarily geared toward the deterrence and
prosecution of a war with the Soviet Union and nations of the
Warsaw Pact both conventionally and by nuclear means. Since
those entities no longer exist, new roles for America's
military are being defined. An exception to this need for re-
definition of cold war roles affects the United States Marine
Corps.
The sole mission of the Marine Corps with regard to
war with the Soviet Union was defense of Norway from a Soviet
attack, while the Army, Navy and Air Force were primarily
geared to meeting the Soviet threat. [Ref. 13:pp. 1 and 3]
The primary use of Marines during the course of the cold war
was as a quick reaction force deployed on Navy amphibious
ships, protecting America's interests throughout the globe.
Examples of these types of crisis response are the Mayaguez
rescue off Cambodia in 1975, the Grenada operation in 1983,
the securing of embassies as was done in December of 1989
during a coup attempt against Philippine President Corazon
Aquino, and evacuation of embassy personnel as was
accomplished by Operations Sharp Edge in 1990, and Eastern
Exit in 1991. [Ref. 13:p. 7]
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Although the Marine Corps has not launched a major
amphibious assault since the landing at Inchon in 1950, the
threat to do so has played a decisive role in present-day
operations. For example, during the Gulf War the threat of an
amphibious assault tied down eight Iraqi divisions from the
area of the main coalition assault and forced the Iraqis to
expend resources in constructing barriers to an anticipated
amphibious assault. [Ref. 13 :p. 6] The amphibious
capabilities resident in the Marine Corps also lend themselves
to effective disaster relief and humanitarian assistance as
was the case during the Bangladesh typhoon in May of 1991 and
the start-up of assistance to famine victims in Somalia in
1993. [Ref. 13:p. 1]
Since the amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps
were never really geared toward conflict with the Soviet Union
or other Warsaw Pact nations, it could be argued that those
capabilities are still needed despite the absence of a rival
superpower. Without the Soviet Union's influence over eastern
Europe and other countries throughout the globe, some analysts
consider the world a much less stable place. Greater
instability means, according to this argument, a greater need
for the rapid reaction capabilities possessed by the Navy and
Marine Corps. One only has to look to the turmoil of former
Yugoslavia to gain an appreciation for this argument.
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2 . The New World Order
The collapse of the former Soviet Union does not
represent the only withdrawal of superpower influence in some
regions of the world. Because the Soviet Union now lacks
influence in various regions throughout the globe, the United
States has been able to pull back some of its worldwide
presence, thereby further diminishing superpower influence.
Since 1990, the United States has initiated a reduction of 38
percent, or 628 bases, in its overseas basing structure.
[Ref. 14: p. 15] This reduction not only creates a vacuum of
superpower influence in some regions but gives up potential
"footholds" for possible use of port or runway facilities in
some areas. Without use of existing facilities from friendly
nations, the need will exist to obtain such facilities by
force. In addition to seizing ports and coastal air
facilities, Navy and Marine Forces would provide the initial
containment of overseas threats and provide the time necessary
to move Army and Air Force units to the theater of conflict.
[Ref. 15:p. 10]
The dwindling number of U.S. bases abroad and the
existence of only one superpower in the world mean that in
future conflicts the Navy and Marine Corps will be employed
more frequently, at least to initially secure facilities for
use by the Army and Air Force. The Navy, along with Marines,
are continuously deployed around the world. These deployments
provide a consistent American presence throughout the world as
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the strategic environment becomes less stable. This
continuous American presence reassures allies, deters
aggressors and provides training to the Navy and Marines in
areas where they may eventually have to fight. Reductions in
the number of U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas
increases the possibility that Navy and Marine Forces at sea
will be the only reaction force near a region in crisis.
[Ref. 16:pp. 55-57]
Two-thirds of the surface of the earth is covered by
water making access to most countries readily available to the
Navy and an amphibious-capable Marine Corps. Additionally,
most of the world's capital, technology, industry and
population are within 50 miles of an ocean, and almost half of
all man-made infrastructure is within 20 miles of a coastline.
[Ref. 16 :p. 56] Moreover, the preponderance of U.S. interests
are readily accessible by the sea, now controlled without
challenge by the United States, making the Navy and the Marine
Corps uniquely capable of power projection in a world of
declining superpower influence abroad. [Ref. 16:p. 56]
3. .
.
.From The Sea ; A New Naval Direction
To better face the post-cold war world, the Department
of the Navy presented a new direction for the naval Service in
a document written by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps titled
. . . From The Sea . This document, published in September of
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1992, was in response to the fundamental shift in national
security policy articulated by the President of the United
States on August 2, 1990. The national security strategy
shifted from focusing on a global threat to greater
uncertainties in regions of the world considered vital to U.S.
national interests. [Ref. 17 :p. 1]
. . . From The Sea was truly a departure for the Navy.
Since they were no longer challenged on the high seas by the
Soviets, the Navy shifted its attention to littoral warfare.
No longer would the Navy be primarily structured toward open-
ocean warfighting, but would concentrate on power projection
from the sea to the littorals, or coastlines, of the world.
This new primary direction for the Navy and Marine
Corps provides that Navy and Marine Forces be used as an
unobtrusive forward presence which can be withdrawn or
enhanced quickly. By concentrating on force projection from
the sea, the Navy and Marine Corps can provide the Unified
Commander a highly sustainable force that can accomplish the
necessary mission; alternatively these forces can seize and
defend an unfriendly port or coastal air facility pending
arrival of Army and Air Force units. [Ref. 17: pp. 2-3]
. . . From The Sea not only is a departure from the
Navy's primary focus, but it also represents a strengthening
of the interdependence of the Navy and Marine Corps. In
addition to officially publishing the new Department of the
Navy policy regarding the focus of the Navy and Marine Corps
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team, a joint Navy/Marine Corps Naval Doctrine Command was
established to best integrate the joint sea-air-land team.
The primary focus of this command is to build doctrine for
naval expeditionary warfare. [Ref. 17 :p. 7]
C. THE CURRENT STATE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
The Marine Corps has been primarily amphibious in nature
since World War II, although some would argue it has been
amphibious since 1775. To date, the most obvious changes to
the original amphibious concept have been the integration of
the helicopter, the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) , and the
amphibious assault vehicle to create an amphibious triad. The
helicopter has allowed the Marine Corps to launch amphibious
operations by air, as well as surface means. Currently, the
practice is to launch two-thirds of the assault units by
helicopter and one third by amphibious vehicles. [Ref. 12: p.
76] The addition of the airborne assault element to the
amphibious operation provides added flexibility to the Marine
Corps because of the vertical envelopment capability now
enjoyed.
The LCAC is a hovercraft capable of high water speeds
while carrying heavy payloads. Some strategists have
suggested the LCAC be used for launching the surface-borne
assault echelon of amphibious assaults and eliminating the
need for a follow-on Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
However, while the LCAC is capable of beyond the horizon
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launches, it is not designed as an assault craft. It is
unarmored, making it vulnerable to small-arms fire and light
shrapnel. Moreover, the LCAC would be severely limited once
ashore due to its inability to climb hills, breach obstacles
over five feet or knock over small trees. The LCAC's proper
role is that of a support vehicle, bringing up tanks and heavy
artillery after the initial amphibious assault. The LCAC
could certainly enhance the capabilities of any amphibious
assault, not only with its ferrying of tanks and artillery,
but also in meeting logistics needs such as food, ammunition
and medical supplies which must be brought up from zero in the
early stages of amphibious operations. [Ref. 18 :p. 42]
However, the slow water-speed of eight miles per hour of
the AAV7A1 and its predecessors have limited the evolution of
the amphibious assault over the last 50 years. Infantry
occupants of the AAV7A1 can only remain in the vehicle for
one-half hour in the water and retain combat effectiveness due
to the combination of heat, noise, fumes and motion within the
troop compartment. [Ref. 18 :p. 40] Therefore, amphibious
ships must disembark the surface-element of the assault force
no more than one-half hour's ride from the shore. Due to the
vehicle's slow-water speed, this distance is approximately
4000 meters, well within sight of the area to be assaulted.
Not only does this virtually eliminate any chance of surprise,
the slow water-speed also forces the surface element to
conduct head-on assaults vice indirect attacks since maneuver
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warfare from the sea is not an option. [Ref. 18 :p. 40] The
lack of maneuverability and slow speed in the water make the
surface-borne element of the assault more vulnerable to any
opposition which would be defending an assaulted coastline.
In addition to being severely limited by its slow water-
speed, the current amphibious vehicle also possesses problems
associated with being an engineering hybrid of ground and
water systems. The AAV7A1, as is true for all its
predecessors, is slower and less maneuverable than naval
landing craft when in the water, and less mobile and lethal
than traditional infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) on land.
Because the AAV7A1 cannot compete on land with today's IFVs it
is not as useful for land operations due to the speed of the
modern battlefield.
The AAV7A1 is also fast approaching the end of its useful
service life. This vehicle, fielded in 1972 and designated
AAV7 , was redesignated as an AAV7A1 after a Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) updated the basic vehicle design.
The SLEP conversion took place from 1983 to 1986 and was
intended to extend the life of the system to the year 2004.
[Ref. 18:pp. 39-41] The deficiencies of the AAV7A1 preclude
the Marine Corps from advancing the tactical doctrine of
amphibious operations much beyond the level they were during
World War II and will not adequately support the concept of
Advanced Amphibious Assault.
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D. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA
Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) as drafted by
the Concepts and Plans Division of the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC) is "the application of maneuver
warfare to a maritime campaign." [Ref. 19: p. 1] The intent
of this concept is not only to upgrade the Marine Corps'
amphibious capabilities, but to fill the void of a diminishing
American overseas presence by forward projection of Naval
Expeditionary Forces composed of Navy and Marine units.
1. A Giant Leap In Evolution Of Amphibious Operations
The concept of Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) is
the next step in the evolution of amphibious operations
developed by the Marine Corps. This concept of advanced
amphibious assaults encompasses every amphibious capability
possessed by the Marine Corps today and adds the element of
operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)
.
The concept of OMFTS lends itself to great
flexibility. The ability to use OMFTS as the method of
amphibious operations presents commanders with new
capabilities and opportunities. Under OMFTS power can be
projected from long distances off shore or from closer
distances based on the situation. During ship-to-shore
movement, surface-borne amphibious forces can approach an area
to be assaulted directly or maneuver for an indirect approach.
Once ashore, forces can hold coastal areas or penetrate
36
deeper. OMFTS is flexible because of two precepts:
operational speed and use of the sea as an avenue of approach.
[Ref. 19:pp. 4-11]
Operational speed is important for the obvious reasons
of enabling amphibious forces to seize the initiative and
retain it, or to continually dictate the pace of battle.
Additionally, operational speed allows for launching
amphibious forces beyond the horizon or beyond the variable
limit of the enemy's perception, perhaps as far as 25 miles
from the coastline. By launching amphibious forces beyond the
horizon of the enemy, he is unable to determine the intent or
objectives and can draw no conclusions about where tactical
phases begin and end. [Ref. 19:p. 5]
Seaborne mobility of Naval Expeditionary Forces
provides a viable threat around the world to enemies of the
United States. This is due to the quick strike capability
enjoyed by these forces to any region with a coastal area.
Operational speed allows amphibious operations to be launched
from beyond the horizon, providing surprise or uncertainty of
the assault approach. The world's oceans, as an avenue of
approach, provide American access to virtually all regions of
the world since the United States is unrivaled in Naval power.
[Ref. 19:p. 11]
Using the sea as an avenue of approach for maneuver
much the same as land surfaces is a tremendous move forward
for amphibious capabilities. This essentially provides the
37
United States the opportunity to use Naval Expeditionary
Forces as floating overseas bases. In many cases these
floating forces are as capable as units based overseas without
bearing the expense of maintaining them in foreign countries.
Because Naval Expeditionary Forces are sea-based, their entry
or exit to threat areas can be as guick as the situation
dictates. While the sea was once considered a barrier to
reaching coastlines, it could now actually enhance our ability
to project power effectively without the expense of such a
large overseas basing structure.
2 . Technology To Support Advanced Amphibious Assault
In order to make the concept of Advanced Amphibious
Assault a reality, advanced technology must be put to use to
improve deficiencies associated with the current amphibious
assault vehicle. The water speed deficiency of the AAV7A1
becomes the limiting factor for advanced amphibious
operations. The slow speed of the AAV7A1 reguires that
amphibious ships be within approximately 4000 yards of the
coastline of the area to be assaulted. Because the amphibious
ships are within visual range prior to the assault, this gives
the enemy time to shift reserves, place mine fields or enhance
defenses. Possessing the capability to launch amphibious
assaults from beyond the horizon will severely complicate the
enemy's defensive decisions, particularly if he has a very
lengthy coastline. Without knowing where the amphibious
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assault will come, he will not know where along his coast he
should defend, locate reserves or place water mine fields.
[Ref. 20:p. 5]
In March of 1993, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies released a paper suggesting that the
world is involved in a "Military Technical Revolution." The
term, Military Technical Revolution (MTR) has implications for
various aspects of military forces in addition to technology.
More precisely, the MTR is a "timely combination of innovative
technologies, doctrines, and military organizations that is
reshaping the way in which wars are fought." [Ref. 21: p. 1]
The argument can be made that the concept of Advanced
Amphibious Assault, whether considered revolutionary or merely
the natural evolution of amphibious assault doctrine, is the
type of innovation discussed by the authors of The Military
Technical Revolution . However, the resulting capability
achieved by the concept of AAA is undisputedly revolutionary.
The addition of OMFTS represents a fundamental advance in
amphibious doctrine that the world's oceans would no longer
represent an effective barrier to power projection from the
United States. Essentially, the sea would represent a
potentially friendly " jumping-of f " point or gateway for Naval
Forces into every nation that owns a coastline. In order to
achieve the concept of AAA, there must also be a technological
advance to create an amphibious vehicle capable of operating
as suggested in Operational Maneuver From The Sea .
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Organizationally, the Navy and Marine Corps are already
shifting their focus toward support of littoral warfare as
demonstrated in the document, . . .From The Sea .
The Marine Corps has been wrestling with the type of
technology needed to field an amphibious vehicle capable of
meeting the objectives of AAA. The vehicle needed to address
the concept of AAA must be equally capable on water and land
as is emphasized by the OMFTS portion of AAA. The vehicle's
needs are broken down into four core capabilities: high water
speed (at least 25 miles per hour to achieve beyond the
horizon launch capability) , high land speed (at least fast
enough to keep up with the Ml Abrams tank) , enhanced armor
protection and greater offensive capability than present. The
vehicle desired by the Marine Corps will be one that can ferry
troops from ship to shore from beyond the horizon quickly,
transition to land smoothly and then serve as an IFV or
maneuver element for a land campaign if needed.
Technology to meet Marine Corps needs for an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle has been under development by the
Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, a
Department of the Navy Laboratory. Carderock has made
significant progress in developing and evaluating technology
such as the planing hull, armor composites and suspension
items necessary to achieve a AAAV. On February 12, 1992 a
Propulsion System Demonstrator (PSD) developed by the
Carderock Division and the corporate team of General Dynamics
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and AAI , reached water speeds in excess of 26 miles per hour,
setting a new world record for amphibious tracked vehicles.
Although the PSD was not a full scale technology demonstrator,
it proved the feasibility of the concept design, principally
the planing hull, for high-water-speed. [Ref. 22]
Currently, the pacing item for final development of
the AAAV is the engine. In order to "lift" the full-sized
hull out of the water and cause it to "plane" near the water's
surface the engine is required to generate a minimum of 2,600
horsepower and fit within the area constraints of the vehicle
so as not to sacrifice cargo space. Traditional IFVs operate
at around 600 horsepower taking up a comparable amount of
space. [Ref. 22] The AAAV, as envisioned, will be one of the
most capable infantry fighting vehicles in the world and it
will also be amphibious.
Development of the technologies necessary to make the
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle possible has come largely
through the efforts of the Carderock Division of the Naval
Surface Warfare Center and development contracts awarded to
two private corporations. This is most likely due, in part,
to the lack of dual use for this system. Private industry is
motivated by profit and since no civilian use for a vehicle of
this type can be imagined, its development does not proceed
unless contracted for. The only subsystem that has seen any
dual use application from past amphibious assault vehicles is
the suspension for use on heavy-duty logging equipment. [Ref.
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23] The history of development of the AAAV would seem to
validate the need for Government laboratories to advance
technology in areas with no civilian use.
E. SUMMARY
The current and future need for amphibious capabilities
for the United States has been addressed and linked to the new
focus of the Department of the Navy for operations in the
future. For the United States to remain a viable superpower,
forward presence and rapid deployment of the American military
are necessary capabilities. The Navy and Marine Corps are
poised to support these goals by focusing on power projection
through the littorals of the world. To help illustrate the
desired future capabilities of the Department of the Navy, the
Marine Corps has developed the concept of Advanced Amphibious
Assault. The Advanced Amphibious Assault concept, and
operational maneuver from the sea enhance the Navy and Marine
Corps level of power projection. AAA forwards the new naval
direction as articulated by . . . From The Sea . This chapter has
also demonstrated the revolutionary nature of the new doctrine
called Advanced Amphibious Assault and detailed the
capabilities this doctrine will provide the United States.
Finally, the level of technology required to support the new
concept of AAA and the methods pursued by the Marine Corps to
attain this level were briefly addressed.
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IV. METHODS OF ACCELERATING ACQUISITION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the
traditional acquisition cycle currently in use for procurement
of major weapon systems within the Department of Defense.
Also, the distinctions between concurrency and streamlining
will be addressed as they relate to the acquisition cycle.
Justification for acceleration of the acquisition process for
the AAAV by the Marine Corps will be provided within this
chapter of the study. Finally, an examination of various
methods to accelerate the acquisition cycle and how those
methods can speed the procurement of the AAAV will be
discussed.
There are methods that can effectively reduce the time
required to field a major weapon system without adding
prohibitive risk to scarce Government resources or the system
program. The intent of this chapter will be to provide some
methods of reducing the amount of time taken by the
acquisition process to begin fielding Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicles to Marine Corps units.
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B. THE TRADITIONAL ACQUISITION CYCLE
The current acquisition process used by the Department of
Defense for procurement of equipment is articulated by the
Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.2.
Prior to the commencement of the acquisition process,
determination of a mission need must take place. This happens
in the form of a Mission Need Statement (MNS) which can be
generated by a military department, the Joint Staff, OSD, or
a unified or specified command.
Once the MNS is approved, following a rigorous process
within various DOD agencies, a Milestone review will take
place to determine whether Phase of the acquisition cycle
can proceed. This phase is known as the "Concept Exploration
and Definition Phase." During Phase the Government will
conduct short term studies to define and evaluate the
feasibility of alternative concepts to satisfy the identified
mission need.
A Milestone I review will determine the success of Phase
0, and signal the initiation of a new program and Phase I of
the acquisition cycle. Phase I is known as the "Demonstration
and Validation Phase" (DEMVAL) of the acquisition cycle. As
the name implies the primary purpose of DEMVAL is to
demonstrate and validate the design approaches and
technologies pursued for the system concept (s). The
acquisition strategy developed in Phase must undergo
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refinement during DEMVAL to identify high risk areas and the
risk management approaches taken for these areas.
To enter the next phase of the acquisition cycle, the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) determines if the program
is ready to enter Phase II, or "Engineering and Manufacturing
Development" (EMD) . The objectives of EMD are geared toward
risk reduction by translating the most promising design
approach developed in Phase I into a stable, producible and
cost effective design. The production process to build the
system will be validated in the course of this phase. Also,
testing during EMD will demonstrate that the system
capabilities meet contract specification requirements and
satisfy the identified mission need by meeting minimum
acceptable operational performance requirements.
A Milestone III review will take place to determine the
effectiveness of Phase II and to determine if the program
warrants continuation. Milestone III marks the most important
decision point in the cycle, due to the fact that a favorable
decision allows the system to enter production, committing
significant Government resources.
Phase III is the "Production and Deployment" phase of the
acquisition cycle. The objectives of this phase include:
(1) establishing a stable, efficient production and support
base, (2) achieving an operational capability which satisfies
the identified mission need, and (3) conducting follow-on
operational and production verification testing to confirm and
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monitor performance and quality and verify the correction of
deficiencies.
Phase IV, or "Operations and Support" of the acquisition
cycle, begins as soon as completed systems, in Phase III, are
delivered to the Government. Entry into Phase IV is not
predicated on a successful Milestone IV review. A Milestone
IV review will only be scheduled if modifications to the
current system are needed.
The preceding paragraphs have provided a general overview
of the defense acquisition cycle. There are numerous
requirements embedded into each phase for a procurement of any
system and there can even be additional requirements depending
on the Acquisition Category (ACAT) of the program.
The traditional acquisition cycle is designed to ensure
that the best possible system is fielded in a cost effective
manner with minimum amounts of risk to the Government. These
overarching objectives create a myriad of obstacles to be
overcome in progressing from identification of a mission need
to fielding a major weapon system.
C. THE ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT PROGRAM
The Advanced Amphibious Assault Program is currently in
the Concept Exploration phase of the acquisition cycle. A
Milestone I review is scheduled for the second quarter of
FY94. [Ref. 24:p. 2]
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Activities to support the future replacement of the
existing amphibious vehicle began in 1985. At that time, the
Marine Corps directed that a broad range of vehicular
subsystems be developed for application to several potential
alternatives. By successive integration of these subsystems
into scale Automotive Test Rigs (ATR) , the technical
feasibility of high-water speed amphibious vehicles was
demonstrated. [Ref. 25: p. 1]
1. AAAV Mission Need Statement
In 1988, as part of the Marine Corps* continuing
mission analysis, deficiencies were identified in assault
capability. These shortfalls were based on the over-the-
horizon (OTH) amphibious assault tactic and the approaching
obsolescence of the AAV7A1 vehicle. These deficiencies
revolved around the primary vehicle system (AAV7A1) utilized
by the Marine Corps for the execution of amphibious
operations.
Based on the vehicle deficiencies, the Marine Corps
presented the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)
Mission Need Statement to the DOD with its Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) 90-91 submission. This MNS identified the
need for a replacement system to the AAV7A1. The Defense
Resources Board (DRB) and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
supported the Marine Corps' MNS and the request to commence a
major system acquisition cycle to correct the deficiency. In
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accordance with the DOD 5000 series of directives, however,
the DRB and DAB directed the Marine Corps to examine a wider
range of concept alternatives than the three systems
identified in their Mission Need Statement for a follow-on
high-water speed amphibian vehicle. The Marine Corps was also
directed to seek commonality with the U.S. Army Heavy Force
Modernization (presently Armored Systems Modernization {ASM}
program) , and examine as a potential system alternative the
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) as acquisition objectives.
[Ref. 26:p. 5]
Because the scope widened, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition (USD{A}) retitled the program as
Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) . The revised Mission Need
Statement was received as an attachment to both the
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) in July of 1988 and the
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) in August of 1988. [Ref.
26:p. 5] Release of the ADM signaled the approval to start
Phase of the acquisition cycle for AAA.
2. AAA Concept Exploration
At Milestone of the DOD Acquisition Cycle, the
Marine Corps was charged with expanding the scope of
alternatives to meet the deficiencies identified in the
Mission Need Statement. This was accomplished by the
identification of thirteen alternatives to be analyzed. These
candidate systems were divided into the four categories:
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high-speed amphibians, slow-speed amphibians, non-amphibians
and non-vehicles. A breakdown of the alternatives by category
is provided in Appendix B. [Ref. 22, 26:p. 7]
Prior to the Cost and Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) being conducted on all thirteen alternative
systems, an effort was made to cull out the less capable
systems. The purpose of this "pre-analysis" was to limit the
COEA effort to a more manageable number of alternatives. This
screening was based on a performance analysis including ship-
to-shore movement, system mobility ashore, survivability, and
lethality. This pre-analysis resulted in six systems being
removed from consideration due to various weaknesses in those
areas. [Ref. 22]
The remaining seven alternatives were then analyzed
for cost and operational effectiveness for the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) when utilizing each system. Each
alternative was tested for its effectiveness by a large,
force-on-force simulation known as the Amphibious Warfare
Model. At the conclusion of the COEA, in March of 1991, the
alternatives were reduced to three systems. The Program
Manager (PM) assessed all concepts to be of medium to low
technical risk and all were deemed to be within its
af fordability range. Of the three remaining systems the high-
water speed amphibian, or AAAV(F) was evaluated as the best
and most effective overall performer. The primary eliminating
factor for the low-water speed amphibian, or AAAV(S) and the
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APC(X), were relatively slow speeds that prohibited full
effectiveness of OTH tactics. [Ref. 27 :p. 22-28]
In November of 1991, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) reviewed the performance thresholds and
objectives for the AAA program and validated the need for the
AAAV(F). [Ref. 26:p. 5]
3. Acquisition Strategy
The Acquisition Strategy was established by the
Program Manager prior to the JROC's approval of the AAAV(F)
system in November of 1991. This strategy is geared toward
the acquisition of the AAAV(F) as a new vehicle for
satisfaction of the Marine Corps' need for a system to meet
the deficiencies outlined in their Mission Need Statement of
July 1988. [Ref. 22]
Under the traditional approach to acquisition of major
weapon systems for DOD, it has been estimated that the AAAV
would not be fielded to Marine Corps units until the year
2007. [Ref. 22] Full operational capability would not be
reached by the Marine Corps until 1 October 2009.
[Ref. 28:p. 11]
Because the existing amphibious vehicle, the AAV7A1,
is already 21 years old and will reach the end of its useful
service life in 2004, the Marine Corps wants to field a
replacement system sooner than presently anticipated under the
traditional acquisition cycle. [Ref. 18:pp. 39-41]
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Additionally, the emerging pre-eminence of Naval and Marine
Corps Forces for employment in America's post cold war
approach to overseas presence enhances the need for a AAAV to
better support "from the sea" operations. [Ref. 29 :p. 15]
D. ACCELERATING PROCUREMENT OF THE AAAV
After a brief explanation of the traditional acquisition
cycle, the Program Manager's Notebook states that, "Not every
program follows this exact format. In fact, tailoring is
highly encouraged." [Ref. 30:p. 1.1-8] The extent of
modification, or tailoring, which can be applied to the
acquisition cycle is dependent on factors such as degree of
program risk, type of program (new, high technology
development or nondevelopmental items) and the time frame in
which the system will be required. The base requirement of
DOD policy for procurement, as rooted in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular Number A-109 and the DOD
5000 series of directives, is that acquisition should be
executed in an efficient and effective manner to achieve the
operational objectives of the Armed Forces of the United
States. [Ref. 30:p. 1.1-8]
The intent of this section will be to examine various
methods, within current law, of tailoring the acquisition
cycle to accelerate or streamline the procurement process for
the AAAV. The focus of this effort will be primarily geared
toward events that traditionally occur in Phases I and II of
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the acquisition cycle for major weapon systems and management
approaches.
1. Concurrency and Streamlining
Prior to initiating a discussion of ways to accelerate
the acquisition cycle for the AAAV, some distinction must be
made between traditional methods used to shorten the
procurement process. Two methods that have been used to
shorten the acquisition cycle are concurrency and
streamlining. Traditionally, some within the acquisition
community have had the tendency to use these terms
interchangeably, obscuring their meanings.
Concurrency is defined as, "part of an acquisition
strategy which would combine or overlap phases of the
acquisition process, or development test and evaluation (DT&E)
and OT&E." [Ref. 31:p. B-17]
The Department of Defense refers to streamlining as
follows:
Acquisition Streamlining-Any effort that results in more
efficient and effective use of resources to design and
develop, or produce quality systems. This includes
ensuring that only necessary and cost-effective
requirements are included, at the most appropriate time in
the acquisition cycle, in solicitations and resulting
contracts for the design, development, and production of
new systems, or for modifications to existing systems that
involve redesign of systems or subsystems . [Ref. 31 :p. B-
3]
Streamlining- (1) An acquisition strategy communicating
what is required in functional terms at the outset of
DEM/VAL phase. Allowing flexibility for application of
contractor ' s expertise, judgment and creativity in
recommending detailed MILSPECs /MILSTDs and other detailed
52
requirements as development nears EMD and production.
Required by DODI 5000.2. Ensures only cost-effective
requirements are included in solicitation and contracts
;
(2) broadly used to denote efforts to shorten the
acquisition process. [Ref. 31:p. B-105]
The obvious difference between concurrency and
streamlining, in either form, is that concurrency makes no
effort to evaluate for eliminating any unnecessary
requirements in the acquisition cycle. Instead, concurrency
concentrates on the acquisition and testing processes in an
effort to overlap the phases so that all tasks can be
accomplished in the least amount of time possible.
Streamlining, on the other hand, assumes the possibility of
eliminating some phases of the acquisition process.
In effect, concurrency could be achieved through
construction of a network model (Program Evaluation Review
Technique {PERT} network diagram) of integrated activities and
events and evaluating the time required to complete the
project and whether activities are dependent or not on
preceding events. [Ref. 32:pp. 667-670] For example, some
activities are not dependent on others; therefore, little
reason would potentially exist to await prior test results
before starting another test. Concurrency can be an effective
method to shave time from the testing process, but it is
limited to only small savings over the life of the acquisition
cycle since no steps are deleted.
By contrast, streamlining is required by DOD
directive. The implication from the definition is that only
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the minimum requirements of the acquisition cycle which
support efficiency and effectiveness and those requirements
written into public law are mandated for use in the
procurement process.
The question must then be asked, "Why are there so
many burdensome checks and balances built into the traditional
acquisition cycle?" One answer to this question is that there
is a tendency for Government officials to mistrust or hold an
adversarial relationship with contractors, which seems to
encourage these officials to add, not drop requirements.
Media attention to acquisition problems such as the Navy's A-
12, the Air Force $600 coffee pots, and the Army's Sergeant
York program make DOD officials very leery of eliminating any
part of the acquisition cycle whether it is mandated by public
law or not. And lastly, DOD acquisition of major weapon
systems requires the expenditure of tremendous amounts of
taxpayer dollars which motivates officials to scrutinize every
program aspect in an effort to protect the public trust.
However, there are methods that can effectively reduce
the time required to field a major weapon system without
adding prohibitive risk to scarce Government resources or the
acquisition process.
2. Tailoring The Acquisition Cycle For The AAAV
In regard to streamlining the acquisition cycle for
the AAAV, determination must be made as to whether conditions
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exist within the program that support a viable streamlining
effort. An important element to streamlining the acguisition
cycle is the ability to tailor the process to fit the program.
The viability of tailoring the acguisition cycle to fit a
specific program can be determined by answering this
fundamental guestion: Does the program lend itself to
tailoring the acguisition cycle, for streamlining based on an
acceptable level of program risk, the system time-frame
reguirements, and the technology involved with the program?
[Ref. 30:p. 1.1-8]
a. Program Risk
Tailoring the acguisition cycle for procurement
implies that only the steps deemed necessary for that specific
procurement are required to achieve program success. While it
is difficult to forecast program success early in the
acguisition cycle, there are indicators that can be used to
determine if tailoring is feasible for a system such as the
AAAV.
The AAA Program is currently in the "Concept
Exploration and Definition Phase" with a Milestone I review
scheduled for March of 1994. Success at the MS I review will
allow formal program initiation and entry into the
"Demonstration and Validation" Phase of the acguisition cycle.
As was stated earlier in this chapter, the purpose of DEMVAL
is to prove the feasibility of the concept selected by the
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Program Office to fill the Mission Need Statement. The AAA
Program Office has tested three scaled prototypes of the AAAV.
One was a Government Built Vehicle, one was a "planing hull"
design from General Dynamics, and the last was a "hydrofoil
assisted planing hull" from FMC. All were scale versions and
were successful in meeting or surpassing performance
requirements. The prototype's proposed armor has been live
fire tested, their hydro appendages have been tested, and full
size water jets have been built and tested. Additionally, two
independent testers have evaluated full-scale mock ups of
these projects. [Ref. 22]
The high-water speed requirement has already been
validated through use of scaled technology demonstrators
constructed for the AAA Program Office. This testing would
normally occur during the DEMVAL phase, but was conducted
earlier as an effort to reduce program risk and prove the
concept. Additional testing on subsystems, crucial to the
high-water speed requirement for armored vehicles has also
been successfully accomplished prior to Phase I of the
acquisition cycle, further reducing risk to the program.
[Ref. 22]
Since the desired concept to fulfill the Marine
Corps' requirement for advanced amphibious assault has been
proven to be feasible, Phase I represents an area where time
spent on concept validation can be reduced. The Program
Office could also request early approval of their Acquisition
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Strategy by the USD{A&T} to release to industry an EMD Request
For Proposal (RFP) in advance, or absence of a Milestone II
review. [Ref. 33: p. 31]
b. Time Requirements
The traditional acquisition cycle will provide the
Marine Corps a full operational capability of AAAVs by October
of 2009 under the best of circumstances. [Ref. 28 :p. 11]
Since useful life of the current system for amphibious
operations ends in the year 2004, the Marine Corps will be
without this portion of the amphibious triad for nearly six
years. Even if Fleet Marine Force units could operate with
the existing system for the six year interval between AAV7A1
obsolescence and AAAV fielding, the current system does not
adequately support the concept of advanced amphibious
operations or OMFTS.
The urgency of need for fielding the AAAV to Marine
Corps units should be considered a vital requirement by DOD
based on the increased level of overseas presence forecasted
for the Navy and Marine Corps resulting from DOD ' s The Bottom-
Up Review . [Ref. 29:p. 15]
c. Program Type
Program type is meant to imply the level of
technical development required for a system. This would
generally be broken down into new or high technology
development, or non-developmental items. [Ref. 30: p. 8]
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The AAAV falls somewhere in the middle of these two
categories. The technologies reguired to achieve the AAAV are
not new or really considered to be on the high end of
technology; however, the integration of all the system
reguirements into one vehicle is a significant challenge.
[Ref. 22]
System integration of this magnitude might preclude
streamlining a program, since contractors and the Government
would be starting from scratch to encompass all system
reguirements in one vehicle. However, this is not the case
with the AAAV. Development has already taken place for this
integration in both industry and the Government. As stated
earlier, the concept of high-water speeds was proven by
General Dynamics and FMC, as well as the Naval Surface Warfare
Center (Carderock Division). [Ref. 22]
3. Evolutionary Acquisition
Evolutionary acguisition is defined by the Department
of Defense as:
Evolutionary Acquisition - An acquisition strategy in
which a core capability is fielded, and the system design
has a modular structure and provisions for future upgrades
and changes as requirements are refined. An evolutionary
acquisition strategy is well suited to high technology and
software intensive programs where requirements beyond a
core capability can generally, but not specifically, be
defined. [Ref. 31:p. B-36]
Evolutionary Acguisition is an acguisition strategy
that can be used to procure a system expected to evolve during
the course of development within an approved architectural
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framework in order to achieve an overall systems capability.
The underlying premise in evolutionary acquisition is the need
to field a well-defined core capability quickly in response to
a validated requirement, while planning for incremental
upgrades to improve the system after fielding. Each
incremental improvement is treated as a unique acquisition
based on continuous feedback from developers, testers and
users of the system. [Ref. 30:p. 1.15-2]
To successfully achieve evolutionary acquisition, the
requirements must first be defined for the general outline of
the system, and then a sequential identification of sub-
systems for incremental improvement, or upgrade must be
completed. [Ref. 30:p. 1.15-2]
An evolutionary acquisition strategy for the AAAV
would involve fielding a vehicle to Marine Corps units that
possesses the following core capabilities:
1.) Water speed greater than 20 knots
2.) Cross country speed equal to M1A1 Tank (45 MPH)
3.) Armor protection against heavy automatic
weapons, Anti-Personnel mines and artillery
fragments.
4.) Offensive firepower to defeat all light armored
vehicles of the time frame.
5.) Carry reinforced rifle squad (17-18 Marines)
6.) Provide NBC protection for crew and embarked
Marines. [Ref. 22]
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The vehicle design to achieve the identified core
capabilities would be identified early in Phase I and become
essentially "frozen" for the remainder of the acquisition
cycle. This technical approach would be an innovative
application of mature technologies yielding a system with
major operational advantages over the current system. Only
evolutionary extensions of proven technologies would be
applied to the vehicle after the base system is fielded.
[Ref. 34:p. 9]
By establishing the core capabilities required this
early and freezing the design, the Government provides the
contractors a fixed target or clearly identified goal to work
toward. The requirements are locked in place, unable to
shift, enhancing the contractor's ability to more rapidly
arrive at a configuration to meet the required capabilities.
Inherent in evolutionary acquisition is the ability of the
contractor to design an end item capable of accepting leaps in
high technology areas such as software or communications
equipment so that the overall system is not obsolete when
fielded, or shortly thereafter.
4. Down-Select To One Contractor
Over the past several years the Congress and Executive
Branch, through the Department of Defense, have demonstrated
a strong preference for competition in all phases of the
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acquisition process. These preferences have been expressed in
legislation and directives. [Ref. 35:p. 6]
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)
strongly affirmed that competition will be the standard
acquisition method used, leaving sole source procurement as an
exception. [Ref. 35:p. 6] Also, the FY1985 Defense
Appropriations Act stated:
None of the funds made available by this Act shall be used
to initiate full-scale engineering development of any major
defense acquisition program until the Secretary of Defense
has provided to the Committees on Appropriations of the
House and Senate:
a. A certification that the system or subsystem being
developed will be procured in quantities that are not
sufficient to warrant development of two or more
production sources, or
b. A plan for the development of two or more sources for
the production of the system or subsystem is being
developed. [Ref. 36:p. 647]
The Department of Defense requires the acquisition
strategy to contain provisions for obtaining competition at
each phase of the acquisition process to include planning for
competition for technologies and ideas in the early phases of
the acquisition cycle. Also required is the use of
competitive procedures that provide the greatest benefit to
the Government. [Ref. 37:p. 1-6]
The mandate for competition is further delineated by
the Secretary of the Navy in SECNAVINST 4210. 6A of 13 April
1988, which requires:
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The development of each project/program will begin with a
minimum of two contractors/contractor teams performing
concurrent but separate development at which time it will
normally be narrowed to two contractors developing a system
to one design.
With so much emphasis toward the use of competition in
Government acquisition, the feasibility of down-selecting to
one contractor early in the acquisition cycle might be
questioned. However, waivers to the competition requirements
are allowed when deemed appropriate.
The relatively low number of AAAVs that are
anticipated to be purchased (approximately 330) [Ref. 22]
implies that a down-selection to one contractor, or "Winner-
Take-All" award will take place at some point prior to
production due to economies of scale. The "Winner-Take-All"
award has been observed to actually increase the projected
cost savings of the contract by eliciting a reduced price for
the effort involved. This observation is supported by the
following reasons: [Ref. 35:p. 33]
1. Winner-Take-All does not sacrifice economy of scale
the way dual sourcing must.
2. The splitting of a production quantity between two
sources reduces the learning effect that eventually
results in potential savings.
3
.
There is no second place or tomorrow in winner-take-
all awards.
4. Due to the unique characteristics of weapon systems
and the costs of keeping facilities idle, it is
doubtful that a contractor will be available or
capable of production in the future once a contract
is lost. This fact necessitates a true "best and
final offer" to attempt to secure the contract. The
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exceptions to this point are those items for which a
commercial market exists.
The reasons listed above were highlighted in 1986 by
the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in a report titled,
Evaluation of Models and Techniques for Estimating the Effects
of Competition . The current environment of declining defense
budgets and a reduced defense industrial base would make those
same reasons identified by the CNA even more compelling today.
In the case of the AAAV procurement, the requirement
to engage in competitive prototyping, and further competition
could be waived by the Department of Defense. Currently there
are two contractors actively engaged in pursuit of building
the AAAV for the Marine Corps. One is comprised of the
FMC/AAI team, while the other contractor is the General
Dynamics Land Systems Division. Both contractor approaches to
the AAAV are very similar in that they have each embraced the
use of "planing hulls" to achieve high-water speeds for the
system. [Ref . 32 & 38] Therefore, little distinction exists
in the technical approaches presented by each contractor to
achieve the requirements for developing an AAAV.
Down-selection to one contractor should occur shortly
after the Milestone I review, so that the Government could
establish a close relationship with the selected contractor to
help speed the final development and production start of the
system. Working closely with two contractors would be more
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costly and difficult due to the dangers of technology transfer
between competitors through the Government.
5. Concurrent Engineering
A method that could potentially shorten the
acquisition time for the AAAV is to encourage contractors to
use the concept of concurrent engineering in development and
production of their system. As defined by DOD:
Concurrent Engineering - A systematic approach to the
integrated, concurrent design of products and their related
processes, including manufacture and support. This approach
is intended to cause developers, from the beginning, to
consider all elements of the system life cycle from
reguirements development through disposal, including cost,
schedule and performance. [Ref. 31:p. B-17]
Concurrent Engineering is actually comprised of
several elements, including multidisciplinary teams, computer
aided tools, and others related to systems engineering. The
concurrent engineering and systems engineering relationship
can be described as the key management approach for
accomplishing the systems acquisition process, with systems
engineering as the primary technical tool for facilitating
concurrent engineering. [Ref. 39: p. 2]
Viewing the manufacturing company from a more
integrated perspective is a requirement for using concurrent
engineering. The intent is to join and extend the product and
process design functions past individual departments and
beyond the enterprise as a whole, tapping into the customer
and supplier chain. The objectives of concurrent engineering
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are: to provide more effective product designs to meet
customer needs and quality expectations; to design products
and the manufacturing process simultaneously; to improve time
to market; and to simultaneously link producible designs to
high-productivity processes. [Ref. 39 :p. 4]
At the earliest stages of development, functional
areas within a company are blended together under concurrent
engineering. This helps to avoid problems that may
potentially arise in production, quality assurance, and market
acceptance. At every stage of the product cycle, customer
requirements are incorporated into available company
resources. [Ref. 39:p. 4]
Concurrent engineering has been made even more
effective with the use of computers and computer tools such as
computer aided design (CAD) , computer aided manufacturing
(CAM) , and computer aided engineering (CAE) . Use of these
types of systems can eliminate the need for paper drawings and
can significantly reduce the time required to develop a
component. [Ref. 39: p. 4]
American industry has been using the concept of
concurrent engineering for some time. A recent success of
this development process was Chrysler's experience in
producing the "Viper" automobile. The Viper project started
in 1989, the prototype was used as the Indianapolis 500 pace
car in 1991, and limited production began in 1992. All this
was accomplished for under $100 million, or 5 percent of what
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car companies usually spend on new-car designs.
[Ref. 39:p. 13]
Chrysler put together a team of 75 people from race-
car teams, designers and manufacturers. Heavy use of
computers was a key factor in scheduling, design and
manufacturing. Half of the tooling came from CAD without the
use of paper drawings. This project also represented the
first time that PERT-type computer programs were used to track
progress of a program at Chrysler. The key to the success of
Chrysler's Viper development team revolved around formulating
an early time and cost schedule and aggressively following it,
through teamwork and exploitation of computer-based tools.
[Ref. 39:p. 13]
Although it may be difficult for the Government to
influence the way a commercial contractor develops a system,
the potential time and monetary savings of concurrent
engineering are impressive. Development methods similar to
concurrent engineering such as Lockheed's "Skunk Works" have
also been quite successful in their ability to produce a
superior design, such as the U2 and SR-71, in minimum
development times. [Ref. 39:p. 3]
It may be possible to take the idea of concurrent
engineering a step further by adding the customer to the
development team. In the case of developing a weapon system
for the Department of Defense this could involve assigning one
or two military representatives and Government engineers to
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the contractor's development team. This would involve all
levels of the contractor's organization in the design effort
and would include the customer as well. It would also serve
to lessen the adversarial relationship sometimes shared
between the Government and the contractor and could keep both
sides better informed of what is taking place with development
of the system.
6. Delete Phase II
As stated in the Program Manager's Notebook, each
acquisition strategy should be tailored to fit a specific
program. The AAAV is in a unique position for tailoring due
to the early efforts at risk reduction and proof of concept
feasibility by the AAA Program Office. [Ref. 22]
Since many of the requirements of Phase I of the
acquisition cycle have already been accomplished prior to a
Milestone I review, a departure from the typical acquisition
cycle can be achieved. The AAA Program Office is scheduled
for a Milestone I review during the second quarter of FY94.
Once approval is received for the start of Phase I, the
driving factor is completion of development of a power-plant
to support a full-scale demonstrator. This engine will be
required to produce at least 2600 horsepower for the vehicle
to achieve high-water speeds. Currently the AAA Program
Office has contracted for development of such an engine with
Motoren Turbinen Union (MTU). [Ref. 22]
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A full-scale demonstrator should be contracted for
after approval to start Phase I. Once a suitable engine has
been developed and produced by MTU, the power-plant can be
integrated in the full-scale demonstrator. Providing these
efforts are successful, the full-scale ATD could be used for
DEMVAL and as a prototype vehicle.
This represents a significant departure for
acguisition of a major weapon system. The feasibility of this
approach rests on the fact that most of the technology needed
to achieve a AAAV is already in existence and has been
effectively demonstrated. The 2600 horsepower engine is the
pacing item needed to make the AAAV a reality and development
of that engine is proceeding smoothly. [Ref. 40 & 41]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter briefly presented the traditional acquisition
cycle to provide a baseline comparison of the requirements
that must be achieved to field a major weapon system. Moving
from phase to phase as described illustrates the "business-as-
usual" approach to acquisition of defense weapon systems.
Methods of accelerating the acquisition cycle for the
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle have been examined during
this portion of the study. The methods selected can be
applied to other systems, although moving from Phase I
directly into production is only recommended due to the prior
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efforts at risk reduction undertaken by the AAA Program
Office.
The use of concurrent engineering and an early freeze of
the vehicle core capabilities could be essential tools to use
the ATD as a prototype and transitioning into low-rate initial
production. Concurrent engineering could establish the end
item as the goal early in the development process, based on
fixed core capabilities. Rapid development of a guality
weapon system at low cost may be possible for a defense
contractor as it was for Chrysler to produce the Viper in
three years at 5 percent of traditional automotive development
costs.
The key to the use of concurrent engineering, and taking
it a step further by integrating Marine Corps personnel and
Government engineers on the development team, is down-
selection to one contractor early in the acguisition process.
Ending the competition between contractors early ends the
added costs of carrying two contractors. It also ends the
burden and cost of testing two vehicular prototypes.
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V. EVALUATION OF ACCELERATION METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to establish critical
criteria to evaluate the four methods for acceleration of the
acquisition cycle for procurement of the AAAV identified in
Chapter IV of this study. Each method will be presented, and
advantages and disadvantages will be discussed. Based on the
relative merits of these methods, recommendations will be
provided on whether to adopt these acceleration methods.
B. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The first approach to accelerating the acquisition of the
AAAV is to adopt an evolutionary acquisition strategy. The
intent of such a strategy would be to establish core
capabilities required for the AAAV, freeze those requirements
for development and production, while planning for future
upgrades after the system has been fielded to Marine Corps
units.
1. Advantages
Perhaps the biggest advantage to adopting an
evolutionary acquisition strategy is that planning for future
upgrades would be taken into account early in the acquisition
process. Component upgrades in areas of computer software or
communications are especially pertinent to this strategy since
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technical advances in those areas are so difficult to
forecast. By accepting this premise early, the contractor
needs only to concentrate on mature technologies,
understanding that if a technological advancement occurs in a
sub-system later, it can be applied when the new development
is mature.
With this strategy, the Government and contractor also
have the advantage of knowing that the core requirements are
frozen and will not continually be changed in an effort to
address a changing threat environment. This means that a
system can be developed and fielded sooner because the
stationary requirements have been frozen earlier in the
process. The basic philosophy of this strategy is tied to the
need to field a well-defined core capability quickly,
responding to a validated requirement. [Ref. 30:p. 1.15-2]
2. Disadvantages
One of the advantages for using an evolutionary
acquisition strategy, however, could also be considered a
prime disadvantage to weapon system procurement. The early
freeze of core requirements in a weapon system could lead to
the fielding of a weapon system that is obsolete at or
shortly after deployment. In other words, the frozen
requirements of 1993 may not be appropriate to the needs in
2008 when the system is fielded. This assumes that the
Government and contractors are working in somewhat of a
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vacuum, basically ignoring significant advances in threat
technology or weaponry and continuing to pursue a system
design that will be obsolete once fielded. The user, or
agency, must be willing to accept an initial warfighting
capability and acknowledge that the program, or system, will
become something more over time as certain technologies
advance. [Ref. 42]
Another disadvantage is that once a design to fill the
requirements has been selected, research may not be continued
to search for alternative methods of satisfying the
requirements desired. This might end promising research into
technologies that could very well be superior to those
selected. It could halt technological breakthroughs which
might benefit this weapon system and others as well.
3. Analysis
The author would argue that the advantages of
evolutionary acquisition far outweigh the disadvantages, based
on the uniqueness of the AAA program.
The disadvantage to fielding a system that might be
obsolete upon deployment due to a freeze in requirements does
not really apply to the AAAV. The amphibious mission of the
Marine Corps is one which is very general in nature. For
example, the amphibious capability was never geared solely to
fighting the former Soviet Union. The capability to conduct
amphibious operations is an ability geared to any region of
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the world as has been since its inception. Therefore, the
likelihood the requirements would change between now and
deployment of the system is remote. Additionally, the AAAV as
envisioned will be so advanced over the current vehicle used
for amphibious operations, the AAV7A1, that once fielded
Marine Corps units will be more capable than ever before.
The potential for an end to research for better
methods to achieve an AAAV is unlikely due to the Government's
own laboratory research efforts at the Naval Surface Warfare
Center (Carderock Division) . The engineers at this center
have researched and validated technologies for several years
to achieve high-water speeds for armored vehicles, as well as
other technologies to improve Marine Corps amphibious
vehicles. This research is ongoing and appears it will
continue in the foreseeable future, especially in areas such
as composite armor, suspension technologies and band track.
The Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center
could arguably be the best center of knowledge for technology
affecting amphibious vehicles in the world.
C. DOWN-SELECT TO ONE CONTRACTOR
The second recommendation for accelerating the acquisition
cycle for the AAAV listed in Chapter IV was to "down-select"
to one contractor early in the procurement process. Currently
there are two contractors who are actively engaged in research
and development to build AAAVs for the Marine Corps.
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1. Advantages
Down-selection to one contractor early in the
acquisition cycle would benefit the Government in that they
would only have to work with one contractor through
development and production of the system. This would
eliminate the concern over technology transfer between
competitors through the Government and allow for a closer
Government-contractor relationship during the life of the
project.
Using one contractor through most of the process will
reduce the amount of testing and evaluation required by half
since only one contractor would remain. Not only would
testing for two competitors eat up time in the acquisition
cycle, it would also greatly increase the costs of testing for
the Government.
2. Disadvantages
A significant disadvantage to choosing one contractor
early is the loss of competition in all phases of the
acquisition process. There are those who will argue that the
longer competition is maintained in the acquisition cycle, the
better price the Government will receive for the product.
They feel without competition there is a tendency for
contractors to overcharge the Government, or to be less
creative in holding down their costs.
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Some would contend that without competition the
Government loses its ability to compare technologies or
systems among contractors. Without more than one contractor,
the Government can only evaluate the system on its own merits.
If there are other technologies available to accomplish the
requirements of the system, they cannot be evaluated since the
single contractor involved will probably be using only a
single concept.
3. Analysis
The purpose of this study is not to determine if
competition or sole source procurement is the most
advantageous or cost effective acquisition method for the
Government. However, there are factors unique to the AAAV
that should be addressed in making this determination.
A sole source procurement for AAAVs is destined to
occur at some point in the acquisition cycle due to the
economies of scale associated with the relatively low number
of vehicles anticipated to be procured. Contractors normally
experience "learning" as production of a system proceeds over
time. Their manufacturing processes mature, the efficiency of
assembly line workers improves and as with any process, the
more it is practiced, the better it is executed, resulting in
cost savings to the buyer. This factor alone should be reason
enough to warrant a sole source procurement based on dilution
of the effect of learning that would occur if two
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manufacturers were used. There is simply not enough work with
this program for two defense contractors to be carried into
production of the AAAV.
Could two contractors be used through development of
the AAAV? This might be a viable strategy if there were
competing technological alternatives among the contractors.
However, both contractors are proposing essentially the same
technological approach to building an AAAV. Because there is
little need for comparison among technologies or approaches
between the contractors, there is no need to carry both
through development of the concept. Competition through
development would exist only for the sake of competition and
would serve to double the expenses to the Government through
this phase and increase the amount of time necessary for
testing. Additionally, the Government possesses an enormous
amount of technical experience with amphibious vehicles and
could significantly reduce the development time reguired of a
contractor by establishing a close Government-contractor
working relationship. Carrying two contractors would make
such a relationship more difficult based on the differing
geographic locations of the contractors and the potential for
technology transfer through the Government.
Some would still argue that carrying competition out
as long as possible will eventually result in a less expensive
product for the Government when, or if, down-selection is
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finally made. The author doubts the validity of this argument
based on these reasons earlier articulated in Chapter IV:
1. No sacrifice to economy of scale through winner-take-all
award.
2. Dilution of learning effect by splitting production
quantities among multiple contractors.
3. No tomorrow for losing contractor in winner-take-all
awards.
4. Early "best and final offer" from contractor when no
commercial market exists due to costs of keeping
facilities idle once a contract has been lost.
These arguments were made in 1986 when defense
spending was peaking for the United States and the defense
business was "booming" for contractors. Today defense
spending continues to decline, which means there is less
business for defense contractors to compete for. This trend
makes those arguments from 1986 more legitimate than ever
before.
D. CONCURRENT ENGINEERING PLUS
The concept of concurrent engineering was suggested
primarily to enhance the development of the AAAV for the
Marine Corps. Concurrent engineering, or management systems
closely related to it have been highly successful in the quick
development and production of complex systems. Chapter IV
provided examples such as the U-2 and SR-71 for the Government
and the more recent example within private industry of the
Chrysler Viper. Most examples of concurrent engineering have
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indicated that the customer or a close representation of the
customer was a part of the concurrent engineering effort. For
example, race car drivers were part of the development effort
on the Viper project for Chrysler. For concurrent engineering
to be most beneficial to the Marine Corps in development of
the AAAV, the author believes use of Marines and Government
engineers on the contractor's development team is essential.
1. Advantages
The fundamental reguirement for use of concurrent
engineering is to view the development process from a more
integrated perspective. This requirement is the principal
advantage to using concurrent engineering. By integrating all
functional departments into one team from the beginning of
development, potential problems that typically arise in
production can be avoided. Supportability issues can be
addressed and resolved before the system is fielded. By
involving the customer early in the process, his requirements
or concerns can be incorporated into the effort and be
satisfied.
Concurrent engineering makes heavy use of computer
tools such as CAD, CAM, and CAE. Use of these types of
systems can eliminate the time and expense of paper drawings
when designing components or tooling. Developmental testing
is also an area where time and monetary savings could be
realized through the use of computer simulations.
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Using Marines and Government engineers would be an
invaluable advantage to both the contractor and the Government
in development of the AAAV. The contractor would reap the
benefits of having ready access to experts in the area of
amphibious vehicles and operations. He would have the
advantage of involving the Government in the development
process which would help to avert any potential
misunderstanding of requirements. Government representatives
in the contractor's facility as part of the team would also
help to subdue the traditional adversarial relationship held
between industry and the Government.
The advantages to the Government are somewhat related
to the advantages for industry. By establishing such a close
relationship with the contractor for development of the AAAV,
the Government will become "co-owners" of the system early in
the acquisition cycle. Development team membership for the
Government representatives will ensure that user input is
heard and carefully considered, if not implemented.
[Ref. 42]
2. Disadvantages
A potential disadvantage of the concurrent engineering
approach is the tendency of this approach to add to the number
of changes which occur during production of the system.
Changes translate to increased costs for the system. This
potential of increased costs is the primary reason that
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concurrent engineering does not enjoy much popularity with the
Congress.
3. Analysis
The full integration of all levels of system
production, logistics, and the Government in concurrent
engineering and aggressive use of computers in this process
could potentially shorten the time traditionally taken to
develop a system, and could also do so more cheaply. One only
has to look to the development of Chrysler's Viper to
recognize these possibilities.
The real issue to be addressed with respect to
concurrent engineering is: How is the threat of costly
production changes averted? This can be addressed in a manner
similar in approach to evolutionary acguisition. Since
changes can be expected to occur in the development of the
system, they should be encouraged to the fullest in the early
stages of this development. However, once the third or fourth
LRIP vehicle is produced, the changes should not be applied
until after the production vehicles have been delivered, and
then as separate acquisitions. The design of production
vehicles would become frozen at the third or fourth LRIP
vehicle in much the same manner as the requirements were
frozen early in the evolutionary acquisition cycle.
Incorporation of this standard into the acquisition strategy
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should adequately address the fears of costly changes since no
changes would be allowed in production.
E. DELETE PHASE II
On the surface this method of accelerating the acquisition
cycle for the AAAV looks very risky and perhaps a little
unrealistic considering that Phase II of the acquisition cycle
is engineering and manufacturing development. Many in the
acquisition community consider this to be the most important
phase of the cycle because it precedes the Milestone III
decision point where determination is made about whether to
build the system.
This method as envisioned is not really a deletion of
Phase II. All of the requirements of Phase II need to be
accomplished in order to mitigate program risk and produce a
system in the most cost-effective manner possible. The
deletion is in name only since those requirements of Phase II
would be accomplished in Phase I (DEMVAL) after the Milestone
I review. This is possible since the concept has already been
demonstrated and validated prior to Phase I. In reality, the
only deletion in the acquisition cycle for the AAAV is the
Milestone II review, since Phase II requirements would occur
in Phase I of the process. Then, when ready, a Milestone III
review would occur, signaling the start of vehicle production.
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1. Advantages
Use of this strategy would properly align the program
to where it actually is in the acquisition cycle. As stated
earlier in this study, the AAA Program Office has taken
measures to mitigate risk and prove the concept of high-water
speed armored vehicles prior to entry into Phase I of the
acquisition cycle. These measures were in the form of
Advanced Technology Demonstrators and Propulsion System
Demonstrators and have proven the concept validity of high-
water speeds. The early measures taken to prove this concept
have left very little to accomplish in a traditional Phase I.
However, the program requires engineering development to
prepare it for production.
With concept demonstration and validation of the
system essentially complete, there is little reason to
dedicate resources and time to another evolution of DEMVAL.
This time could be better spent in development of engineering
and manufacturing processes for production of the vehicle.
The technologies involved with producing a AAAV are mature and
understood by industry. The difficulty is the integration of
all requirements of the AAAV into one vehicle, which warrants
time spent on development.
2. Disadvantages
The primary disadvantage of this approach derives from
the requirement for a power-plant for this vehicle that must
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produce at least 2 600 horsepower for the system to achieve
high-water speeds. The engine must do so and remain in the
confines of a predetermined amount of space for the engine
compartment. The engine is currently under development and is
considered the pacing item for producing the AAAV. Should
problems arise in development of the engine, it is possible
that the remainder of the vehicle could have been developed,
relying on the 2600 horsepower engine, and the engine could
not be produced. This could even necessitate the re-design of
the vehicle itself to match a power-plant of different
dimensions than previously anticipated. Heavy reliance on an
undeveloped system component could put the overall program in
jeopardy if the component cannot be produced.
3. Analysis
On the surface, this strategy appears risky because so
much rides on development of the engine to power the AAAV.
However, a significant amount of time could be saved in the
acquisition cycle if this method were successful.
Since the engine is the pacing item for producing a
successful full-scale AAAV, determination of whether to use
this method should ride on the engine development. Currently,
development of the 2600 horsepower engine is progressing on
schedule with the expectations that it will be produced
somewhere around October of 1994. [Ref. 41] The Milestone I
review is scheduled for March of 1994, and it is assumed that
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at this review, permission would be obtained to commence Phase
II activities in Phase I of the acquisition cycle.
Before this strategy is put in place, an in-process
review with the contractor developing the engine should be
held to determine the likelihood of his delivering the engine
on time. If development is still progressing smoothly, then
RFPs should be released to industry for production of a full-
scale prototype and eventual production of the system. This
would represent the down-selection to one contractor discussed
earlier. By the time the full-scale prototype is delivered to
the Government, the 2 600 horsepower engine should have been
produced, delivered to the Government and tested. At this
point the power-plant could be integrated into the AAAV and
further development could proceed.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the advantages and disadvantages
associated with each method recommended to shorten or
accelerate the acquisition cycle for procurement of the AAAV
for the Marine Corps. As with any acquisition program, there
are risks involved for the procuring activity. The intent
with the recommended methods is not to increase the level of
risk to a point unacceptable for the Government. The Marine
Corps is in a unique position to implement the recommended
methods of acquisition acceleration. These advantages exist
as a result of the AAA Program Office's early attempts at risk
84
mitigation and in-house expertise with amphibious vehicles.
This tailoring of the acquisition cycle for the AAAV
procurement can proceed without significantly increasing the
amount of risk to the program.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this research effort was to define the
concept of advanced amphibious assault and how this concept
has been realized by the AAAV. Additionally, this study
focused on methods of accelerating the acquisition process for
procurement of the AAAV and evaluated these methods against
their application to the U.S. Marine Corps AAAV program.
Based on this study, the following conclusions are made.
1 . The concept of Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) , to
include operational maneuver from the sea, is a
revolutionary advance in warfare.
The heart of the AAA concept is operational maneuver from
the sea, which is the smooth transition of seaborne Marine
Forces from the world's oceans to land areas. This concept,
as supported by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle,
essentially provides for maneuver warfare on the sea as well
as on land. The AAA concept minimizes the ocean as a barrier
or obstacle to American power projection through Naval Forces.
Use of the AAA concept and world-wide dominance of the U. S.
Navy provide a significant component of a credible forward
presence for the United States as the American overseas basing
structure continues to decline.
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2.
The existing system used by the Marine Corps for
amphibious operations is inadequate for support
of the Advanced Amphibious Assault concept.
Since 1972, the Marine Corps has relied on the AAV7/AAV7A1
family of amphibious vehicles to support their amphibious
operations. The AAA concept emphasizes speed, mobility, and
maneuver, on water and land. With a top water-speed of
approximately eight miles per hour, the AAV7A1 is extremely
limited in its ability to support any of the goals of AAA.
Embarkation of the vehicles must occur within 4000 yards of
the landing area due to various limiting factors of the
current system. The time required to transit the distance
from ship-to-shore limits the maneuver ability in the water to
a straight-line, frontal attack of the area to be assaulted.
Once ashore, the AAV7A1 does not possess the cross country




The AAAV procurement represents a program qualified for
acceleration of the acquisition cycle based on urgency
of need, program type and program risk.
One of the most effective methods for accelerating the
acquisition cycle for procurement of major weapon systems is
through tailoring the acquisition process to match the system.
Tailoring should only occur if certain conditions can be met
relating to time requirements, program risk and program type.
Since the current amphibious vehicle used for the surface-
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borne element of amphibious operations is inadequate for use
with the AAA concept and is fast approaching the end of its
service life (2004) , the need to field a replacement system
seems legitimate.
The requirements established for the AAAV do not push the
edge of technology. Each element of the AAAV requirements
package is readily achievable through existing or mature
technology. While the AAAV does not represent a "non-
developmental" program, the amount of development required is
significantly less than that required for new or high
technology development. The challenge to the program is
integration of all requirements in one weapon system.
Closely related to program type is the risk associated
with the program. AAA represents a program that has
aggressively taken action to minimize risk in concept
development for the AAAV. Prior to entering the Demonstration
and Validation Phase of the acquisition cycle, the Marine
Corps has validated the concept of high-water and land speeds
in one vehicle through technology demonstrators.
4 . The traditional benefits of competition will not be
realized with the procurement of the AAAV.
Competition will most likely not benefit procurement of
the AAAV. Economy of scale considerations will preclude the
splitting of the production award between two defense
contractors since only approximately 330 AAAVs are expected to
be procured. The similarity in technical approaches of the
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two contractors also negates any real need for competition to
take place, since whichever contractor is chosen will deliver
a AAAV using a planing hull approach. Finally, the declining
defense business base means contractors will be forced to be
more competitive to survive in the environment of today. This
will mean early, "best and final offers," and a tendency for
contractors to better contain costs once contracts are
awarded. Cost containment will take on even more significance
in future Government contracts since there will be less
defense business and contractors are likely to be more closely
evaluated on their past performance, to include cost
containment on Government contracts.
5. A strategy for accelerating procurement of a weapon
system should be evaluated specifically by the effect
it will have on the particular system acquisition.
Each weapon system procurement must be viewed as an unique
evolution within acquisition. The concept of tailoring the
acquisition cycle to "fit" specific system procurement
indicates the importance of this premise. A strategy which
has been successful in accelerating the procurement of a
system in the past may not do so for a system different in
program type. The concept of concurrent engineering is a good
example of a method or process that can quickly produce a
high-quality system in areas where mature technologies are
involved, but one that may not be as appropriate for systems





That the AAA Program Office tailor its acquisition
strategy based on urgency of need, program type, and
program risk.
As articulated by the Program Manager's Notebook the
extent to which an acquisition cycle can be tailored should be
related to urgency of need, program type, and program risk.
Chapter IV of this study argues that the AAAV is the type of




That the AAA Program Office adopt an evolutionary
acquisition strategy for procurement of the AAAV.
Evolutionary acquisition will benefit development and
production of the AAAV in that core requirements will be
established early in the acquisition cycle, and then become
"frozen" for the remainder of the program. This strategy will
recognize early-on that advances will occur in certain
technologies used on components in the system. Those
components can be designed with an eye toward upgrades after
the system has been produced and fielded. This will limit
costly changes to the vehicle and permit those advancing
technologies to mature at someone else's expense prior to
integration on the AAAV.
3 That the Program Office down-select to one contractor
for development and production of the AAAV, placing
emphasis on use of the concurrent engineering concept.
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Shortly after the Milestone I review, the Marine Corps
should down-select to one contractor for development and
production of the AAAV. The traditional benefits of
competitive prototyping and second sourcing appear to be
nonexistent based on the unigue characteristics of this
program and the current defense environment. The use of
concurrent engineering, with close Government and USMC
involvement, require that one contractor be chosen early in
the acquisition cycle. Early selection of one contractor will
prevent the undue costs associated with multiple contractor
relationships, risk of Government sponsored technology
transfer and enhance the benefits associated with concurrent
engineering.
4 . That the AAA Program Office obtain permission at the
Milestone I review to engage in engineering and
manufacturing development activities during the course
of Phase I of the acquisition cycle.
Chapters IV and V of this study referred to this strategy
as "deletion of Phase II." While under this strategy, the
program would move directly from Phase I to production or
Phase III, there would be no actual deletion of the
requirements inherent in the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Phase of the acquisition cycle. This strategy
simply begins those requirements while the program is still in
the Demonstration and Validation Phase of the cycle. This is
possible due to the early efforts taken by the AAA Program
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Office to mitigate risk and prove the validity of the AAAV
concept. In essence, most of the goals of Phase I have been
accomplished for the AAAV prior to a Milestone I decision.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the viable methods and associated risks of
accelerating the procurement process for the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)
?
An evolutionary acguisition strategy and down-selection to
one contractor made shortly after the Milestone I review
represent two methods for accelerating the acquisition process
for the AAAV. Further acceleration can be achieved by use of
concurrent engineering, making available to the contractor the
corporate knowledge resident within the Marine Corps and Naval
Surface Warfare Center (Carderock Division)
.
The risks associated with acceleration of the acquisition
process for the AAAV are primarily related to cost overruns,
schedule delays, and overall risk to the program.
2
.
What is the concept of AAA as it relates to the current
roles and missions of the United States Marine Corps
and how is it manifested by the Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle?
The concept of Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) is
detailed in Chapter III of this study. In summary, AAA is the
smooth transition from the sea to shore in armored vehicles.
It is the ability to maneuver on the sea as well as on land
92
from distances over the horizon, which will provide doubt as
to the area to be assaulted. AAA, in concert with a strong
Navy, provides a credible method for the projection of
American military power in accordance with its post-cold war
security doctrine.
3 . What are the critical criteria against which the
methods of accelerating acquisition should be
evaluated?
Specific risks associated with each acceleration method
were identified, focusing on factors that might increase the
costs to the program in development or production of the
system. Also, specific risks appropriate to acceleration
methods were noted by questioning the effect of these methods
on the acquisition schedule for the AAAV. Finally, any factor
that might put the AAA Program at risk in general was used as
test for each acceleration method.
4 . What types of risks are associated with each
acceleration method that has been presented?
In Chapter V, the selected methods for accelerating the
acquisition cycle for procurement of the AAAV are evaluated as
to the risks they might bring to the program. The specific
risks to each acceleration method vary since the acceleration
methods themselves differ. A discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages relevant to each acceleration method is also
provided. These discussions will help to better determine
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whether the strategies are potentially viable for use with
procurement of the AAAV.
5. What is the recommended strategy for procurement of a
new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle for the United
States Marine Corps?
The recommended strategy for procurement of the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle is based on an evolutionary
acquisition strategy. Next, down-selection to one contractor
for development and production of the system is recommended so
that Government and industry can work closely together in a
non-adversarial relationship making judicious use of the
concurrent engineering concept. Finally, the deletion of
Phase II of the acquisition cycle, or more properly, the
accomplishment of Phase II requirements during Phase I of the
process for the AAAV is recommended.
These recommendations are provided as specifically
applicable to the AAA Program. They are made due to the
unique posture of the AAA Program based on early attempts at
risk reduction, use of mature technologies, and excellent in-
house amphibious vehicle expertise.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Earlier studies have lauded the influence competition can
have on the acquisition of major weapon systems. However,
other research has suggested that continued competition or
second sourcing may not be as beneficial to lower prices for
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the Government as earlier believed. The Center for Naval
Analysis observed that Winner-Take-All Awards increase the
projected cost savings of the contract by deriving a lower
price for the system. The premise for this finding was
discussed in Chapters IV and V of this study.
The researcher believes there is some truth to both
assertions. Future research in this area could attempt to
determine the type of system or environment that would be
conducive to competition carried through most phases of the
acquisition cycle. The study could focus on the size of the
buy, the numbers of systems to be procured or the defense
environment, specifically defense spending, at the time.
Comparison could be made between systems that used
competition, those that did not, large number buys, small
number buys, procurement during the defense buildup of the
early 1980s, and procurement in an era of declining
expenditures. Research in this area could provide a framework
or tailoring mechanism for the type of competition strategy
recommended for each system based on its inherent
characteristics and the environment in which it is to be
procured.
An area that could be beneficial to the Marine Corps once
the AAAV is fielded would be a study to determine the best way
to provide system maintenance and logistics support.
Currently Marine Corps units that hold the existing amphibious
vehicle, the AAV7A1, possess an in-house capability to conduct
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up to fourth echelon maintenance and maintain their own repair
parts organic to the battalion level unit. The AAAV is a
vehicle that promises to be more complex and expensive to
maintain than the current system. A study could be conducted
to determine how to best plan for support of the AAAV when
fielded to Marine Corps units. Comparisons between an
architecture similar to the one now in place for support and
a method whereby most maintenance would be accomplished by a
depot could be made to determine the most cost-effective




AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle
AAA Advanced Amphibious Assault
AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACAT Acquisition Category
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
ATD Advanced Technology Demonstrator
ATR Automotive Test Rig
CAD Computer Aided Design
CAE Computer Aided Engineering
CAM Computer Aided Manufacturing
CE Concept Exploration
CICA Competition in Contracting Act
CNA Center for Naval Analysis
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
DAB Defense Acquisition Board
DEMVAL Demonstration and Validation
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DLSIE Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DOD Department of Defense
DRB Defense Resources Board
DT&E Development Test and Evaluation
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ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development
ICE Independent Cost Estimate
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicles and Personnel
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production
LVT Landing Vehicle Tracked
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MDA Milestone Decision Authority
MNS Mission Need Statement
MTR Military Technical Revolution
OMFTS Operational Maneuver From The Sea
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation
OTH Over-The-Horizon
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense
PDM Program Decision Memorandum
PERT Program Evaluation Review Technique
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PSD Propulsion System Demonstrator
RFP Request For Proposal





CATEGORY I (HIGH SPEED AMPHIBIANS)
-AAAV(F) (Newly designed vehicle)
-AAV7A2(F) (Reconfiguration of current vehicle for high water
speed)
CATEGORY II (SLOW SPEED AMPHIBIANS)
-AAAV(S) (Newly designed slow-speed amphibian)
-AAV7A1 (Current system)
-AAV7A2(S) (Current system dramatically improved through
second SLEP)
-SUBMERSIBLE (Tracked underwater vehicle)
CATEGORY III (NONAMPHIBIANS)
-APC(X) (Newly designed armored personnel carrier)
-LAV-25 (Wheeled vehicle currently in Marine Corps inventory)
-M113A3
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-M2A2 BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE (Currently in U.S. Army
inventory)
-FIFV (U.S. Army ASM program) (Required for commonality
analysis)
CATEGORY IV (NONVEHICLES)
-SURFACE OPTION (Infantry brought to shore in shelters mounted
on LCAC)
-AIR OPTION (All infantry is carried ashore in helicopters)
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